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ABSTRACT
THE NEW TERRORISM AND THE AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY
TÜRE, NAİL
M.A., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı
June 2004
This thesis analyzes the consequences of the American National Security Strategy, carried out as
part of the post September 11 ‘war on terrorism’, in terms of Turkey’s security. Whether the reasons or
aims of a declaration of war on terrorism are right or not, the reality is that the U.S. has made important
steps with significant implications for the whole world as well as for Turkey. Terrorism, which has
changed some of its features by the help of elements of globalization, hit the U.S. The U.S. perceived
that fighting against terrorism could not be successful by traditional retaliation as had been done by the
U.S. before September 11. This new enemy required a new plan, and therefore, a new security strategy
began to be carried out. Undoubtedly, Turkey has been affected by the NSS of the U.S., due not only to
her geographic position that is next to the Middle East chosen as a target place by the U.S. but also to
her close relationship with the U.S. the America’s new strategy has forced Turkey to reevaluate her
security priorities and threat perceptions that have been shaped by the end of Cold War. In the
assessment, it is seen that the new American NSS has increased Turkey’s security anxieties.
Keywords: Turkey’s Security, American National Security Strategy, New Terrorism, Greater Middle
East , Threats for Turkey.
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ÖZET
YENİ TERORİZM VE AMERİKAN ULUSAL GÜVENLIK STRATEJİSİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN
GÜVENLİĞİ İÇİN SONUÇLARI
TÜRE, NAİL
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı
Haziran 2004
Bu tezde, 11 Eylül saldırılarından sonra uygulamaya başlanan Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik
Stratejisinin Türkiye’nin güvenliği açısından ortaya çıkardığı sonuçlar incelenmektedir. Teröre karşı
ilan edilen savaşın sebepleri veya amaçları haklı olsun veya olmasın, Amerika’nın tüm dünya ve
özellikle de Türkiye için önemli sonuçlar doğuran adımlar atmaya başladığı gerçeği ortadadır.
Küreselleşmenin yardımıyla bazı özellikleri değişen terörizm Amerika’yı vurmuştur. Bu saldırılarla
Amerika , 11 Eylül saldırılarına kadar başvurduğu klasik misilleme yöntemi ile teröre karşı savaşın
başarılı olamayacağını anlamıştır. Yeni düşman yeni bir plan gerektirdiğinden yeni güvenlik stratejisi
uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz Türkiye, hem hedef olarak seçilen Orta Doğu’ya komşu olan
coğrafi konumu, hem de Amerika ile yakın ilişkileri nedeniyle bu yeni güvenlik stratejisinden
etkilenmektedir. Bu strateji Türkiye’yi, soğuk savaşın bitmesiyle şekillenen güvenlik önceliklerini ve
tehdit algılamalarını yeniden değerlendirmeye zorlamıştır. Değerlendirmede, stratejinin Türkiye’nin
güvenlik endişelerini arttırdığı görülmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Güvenliği, Amerikan Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, Yeni Terörizm,
Büyük Orta Doğu, Türkiye için Tehditler.
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1CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION
There are many debates about whether the current United States (U.S.) policy is
right or not, and discussions about the sincerity of the U.S. concerning the fight
against terrorism. Whether one agrees with it or not, there is a reality that the U.S.
launched her new National Security Strategy (NSS) under the name of the ‘war
against terrorism’. The entire world system is affected by this war. Since Turkey
certainly has been affected by this era in world politics, it is important to try and
understand what kinds of outcomes have emerged for Turkey’s security as a result of
the new NSS of the U.S. This thesis analyses the effects of the NSS of the U.S. on
the security of Turkey.
This study argues that the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle
East, and especially in Iraq, has increased Turkey’s security anxieties. In the post-
Cold War era, Turkey has concentrated on the south in terms of her security, because
threats to Turkey’s integrity have tended to come from the south, not north. After the
realization of the American NSS, some of these threats became to be felt more
intensely. The main aim of this study is to be able to clarify which threats emerged
with the new situation.
In addition, in order to support and better analyze the issue, this thesis will
initially attempt to provide answers to the following questions: How has ‘new
2terrorism’ differed from classical terrorism and assumed the character of a non-state
actor after the Cold War? What kinds of changes have taken place in American
foreign and security policies after the September 11 attacks? What are the main
elements of the new American NSS? What are the security policies and threat
perceptions of Turkey after the Cold War?
The September 11 attacks, targeting the homeland of the U.S., shocked the
entire world. It was a phenomenon, which nobody had dared to attempt since the
Pearl Harbor assault. In nearly all assessments made after the September 11 attacks,
the concept of ‘new terrorism’ can easily be seen. Indeed, the concept of ‘new
terror’, emerged with the end of the Cold War, had already existed but it became
‘popular’ with September 11. Many evaluations about ‘new terrorism’ have been
made before and after September 11, some going so far as to perceive the attacks as a
‘polar’ capable of balancing the unipolar international system after the Cold War. In
the attacks of September 11, all characteristics of ‘new terrorism’ can be seen;
moreover there is a challenge to the hegemon. Chapter II clarifies the characteristics
of ‘new terrorism’ as a starting point, igniting a to new world order, and explores
these features seen in the events of the September 11.
The U.S., as the only superpower in the post-Cold War era, felt obliged to take
action because on the one hand her public was distressed on the other hand her
superpower image was damaged. A big blow had been received and revenge had to
be taken. At this point, President Bush declared the war against terrorism and the
world was divided between ‘others’ and ‘US’. This declaration of war necessitated a
new plan and a new strategy. The U.S. gave up its method of retaliation, which had
been used by previous presidents as a tool of war against terrorism. The new NSS of
the U.S. was now put into action. The main parameters of the strategy are based on
3realistic foundations. They clearly indicate to paces of the U.S. carried out today and
in the future. Considering that a superpower is unlikely to bluff about such a serious
security issues, it is not so difficult to say ‘the world will be never same again’. In
addition, turning towards the Middle East, the Iraq case proved that the U.S. is very
serious about implementation of new NSS. Chapter III identifies US’s changing
perceptions and methods about war against terrorism, main parameters of the new
strategy and outcome of the idea of war against terrorism.
This American NSS undoubtedly would affect Turkey’s security. In order to
clarify implications of the American NSS on Turkey’s security, the meaning of
Turkey’s security should be explained. The end of the Cold War altered the security
and threat perceptions of Turkey. Since the Soviet threat, which had been in the core
of Turk’s anxiety, was disappeared and the Gulf War created several outcomes for
Turkey’s new foreign and security policy, threat and security perception shifted. In
the beginning of 1990s, they were directed to the south from the north. Consequences
of the end of the Cold War, ethnic problems, nationalism, asymmetric threats such as
terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) affected in the new threat
assessments. Particularly terrorism became a major threat to the integrity of Turkey.
In Chapter IV, pre-September 11 security and threat assessments and perceptions of
Turkey are evaluated to make a concrete comparison with post-September 11
situations. So as to understand anxieties of Turkey correctly, cornerstones of her
security policy, which were shaped after the Cold War, should be understood.
Not only because of her geographic position but also her close relations with
the U.S., whether she wants or not, Turkey is involving in the new phase of new
world order. Turkey has a significant role in the scenario because shaping of the
world started right beside her. Radical changes, disagreements and problematic
4events have emerged owing to the intentions of the U.S. In Chapter V, outcomes of
the implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East regarding the Turkey’s
security will be explained.
The methodology used in this thesis depends on descriptive and analytical
research of the resources. The resources that are used in the thesis include; primary
sources, including official documents and reports, interviews, intelligence reports,
military field manuals. Especially, information about Turkey’s security and threat
perceptions are based on military field manuals, which clearly point who the enemy
for Turkey is. Secondary sources consist of reports, documents, and articles procured
from edited books, periodicals, online databases, newspapers, and newsmagazines.
5CHAPTER II:
NEW THREAT: THE MEANING OF THE SEPTEMBER 11
ATTACKS AND THE NEW TERRORISM
The world, which has already been observing a new structure and order after
the Cold War, is witnessing new dimensions of changing politics after the attacks of
the September 11. Terrorism, which is in all new threat assessments in the Post-Cold
War era, proved to be yet more important. Moreover, terrorism has become an
element directing the world politics and international relations. Terrorism used to be
a tool for the actors of the world politics to reach their aims. But now it became itself
an actor in the international arena. Once a tool in the hands of some states, terrorism
has become a non-state actor. International relations began to rotate around terrorism.
Events, after the September 11 attacks that hit the only superpower within her
homeland, are the most remarkable examples of this fact. The U.S. has changed her
foreign policy. She stated to pursue a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy at
the global level against the new enemy (Cottey, 2002). War on terrorism started.
September 11 is a turning point not only for U.S. but also for the whole world.
The U.S. has accepted terrorism as a threat and enemy. If so, who is the
enemy? What are the characteristics of this ‘new enemy’? What makes it ‘new’?
What are the reasons for which the U.S. started the war on terrorism? In order to
understand the starting point of the U.S.’s current politics, evolution and
6characteristics of the ‘new terrorism’ should be explored. In this chapter, the
evolution of the terrorism with the end of the Cold War will be explained shortly to
show its changing role in the world. Additionally, characteristics of new terrorism
will be explained. After putting characteristics, how and why ‘new terrorism’ forms a
global threat for all states will be elucidated. Then aspects of September 11 will be
shown in the perspective of new terror. So features of new terror in September 11
will be pointed clearly. Lastly, the aim of the September 11, messages given by
terrorists and taken by the world will be explained. Accordingly, the new global
threat will be explained in detail which will provide us with an understanding of the
roots of both the U.S.’s opinions and its current tough politics.
2.1. What is New Terrorism?
2.1.1. Terrorism in the Cold War Era
In order to understand current different position of terrorism in the world arena,
its Cold War role should be shortly mentioned. As has been known, terrorism is a
cheap, low-risk and highly effective tool, which allows the weak to challenge the
strong. These can be labeled as the fixed characteristics of terrorism. As the time
passes, some modifications and additions on terrorism may be done according to
world position. For instance, according to Brian Jenkins, in the 1970s and 1980a
terrorism was driven largely by ideology or the ‘narrow nationalism’ that spawned
separatist violence. He continues that toward the end of the century, proclaimed
religious beliefs increasingly provided its contexts (Jenkins, 2001: 5). In the Cold
War era, three important aspects of terrorism can be easily seen. These are first
struggle for independence; second method used by some states in international
politics and third rivalry tool of superpowers against to each other (Tuğtan, 2002).
7During the Cold War, terrorism was viewed within a revolutionary context
(Hoffman, 1998: 22). Many terrorists have defined themselves as “freedom fighters”.
However, this form of the terrorism expanded to include nationalist and ethnic
separatist groups (Pillar, 2001: 12). According to Hoffman, exiled nationalist
minorities, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Basque ETA
and even unknown South Moluccan irredentist group seeking independence from
Indonesia, adopted terrorism as a means to draw an attention to themselves and their
respective causes (Hoffman, 1998: 26).
As well, some states used terrorism in pursuing their foreign policy goals.
According to Stohl, states may prefer to apply terrorism if they regard themselves
powerless to pursue other policy instruments (Stohl, 1988: 161). It can be shortly
said that state sponsored-terrorism was born due to this. Due to its fixed
characteristics; cheap, low-risk, highly effective, challenge of weak, states are ready
to use international terrorism as a form of covert warfare in order to undermine rival
countries (Selvi, 2003: 28). Terrorism has been used as a weapon by some weak
states that cannot compete with the rest of the world economically, politically, and
militarily. These countries understood that applying terrorist strategies is an effective
way of making political changes in the international system or challenging their
rivals. This made terrorism a tool for state actors. This kind of terrorism has been
used even after the Cold War and it was the most popular one until September 11.
Additionally, terrorism was also a tool of rivalry between superpowers. With
the end of the World War II, well-known meaning of war, namely total war, turned
out to be an action exceeding the capacity and budgets of states separately. The
world was divided between two superpowers in a very strict manner and two blocs
were formed around those. Given that any war in a traditional meaning was thought
8as an end of the world due to the destruction power of the weapons, the total war
became more risky and undesirable option for states. There was no direct armed-
conflict between them because no side wanted to take such kind of a risk except for
using terrorism (Stohl, 1988: 192). For that reason, as Tuğtan states, many of the
wars after the World War II can be categorized as “low intensity conflict” (Tuğtan,
2002). Terrorism and regional wars were perceived as a reflection of a total war.
Both sides used this option (Akgün, 2001: 116) because of both cost and demolishing
damages of the total war to the whole world. Namely, terrorism was a tool of the
Cold War period used by superpowers to implement their foreign policies. But after
the Cold War, position of terrorism started to change. It started to take new role in
the international arena.
2.1.2. Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era
The end of the Cold War brought to an end to the period of bipolarity. Since
then, academics, journalists and policy-makers have tried to work out exactly what
kind of power structure would replace it (Smith, 2001). At this point, position of
terrorism changed. It started to try to fill up this gap emerged with disappear of the
Soviet Union. In this part, changing process of the terrorism and emerge of ‘New
Terrorism’ as a non-state actor will be clarified.
Disappear of one polar and accelerate of globalization ‘caused’ new problems,
and some concepts gained new meanings. Security is one of them. Very simply
Amitav Acharya defined security as “reducing vulnerability to threats” (Smith,
Acharya, 2002: 16). It has gained new dimensions and its aspect was broadened with
the end of Cold War. New threats and new enemies have been added to sense of
security concept within the context of globalization. Ethnic nationalism and regional
conflicts, proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, religious fundamentalism,
9political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, smuggling all
kinds of person and weapon can be listed as the main threats in the new era (National
Position of Turkey, 2002). K. Jayasuriya argues that new language of the security
reflects the fact that “globalization has changed the internal architecture of the state
and this is clearly apparent in the increasing emphasis placed on aspects of 'risk' and
'security' across social life” (Jayasuriya, 2001).
In the light of these explanations, terrorism emerged as one of the main threats
of new world order if the human security a concept clearly holding the key to the
building of the international order in the 21st century is considered in a very simply
and its basic manner as a protection of human life. Because, today terrorist attacks
are horrifying indication of the pervasiveness of the threats to people's safety, rights
and lives.
Of course, there is no doubt that terrorism threat existed in the Cold War era,
but as Kostas argues, it had never been considered so seriously as an actor or even a
polar in the world arena (Kostas, 2002: 101-115). New Terrorism can be accepted as
an actor in world politics because: Their activity area is the world not a limited
region in one part of the world. Even, their aim is to change the whole world system
not to change political order in one country or not any independence claims. They are
trying to direct world politics. Results of new terrorist actions have influenced not
only a specific country but also the whole world affairs. For instance, September 11
changed all international politics. Besides, since they are mostly religious-motivated,
terrorists have beyond nationalistic sensation. Religion became the primary motive
for terrorists (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). Lastly, it generally targets superpower and
hegemon to challenge to her. It is usually dealing with the U.S. Religion and whole
world became major issue of terrorism by replacing ideology and country.
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Reactions of the states and the international organizations strengthen the non-
state role of New Terrorism. For instance, after the attacks, the U.S. divided the
world as the fighters against terrorism and terrorists. More simply, unique
superpower has been determining her policy priorities according to terrorism. As
well, although it was established for communism threat, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s (NATO) new mission in the post-Cold War era has been tried to be
reshaped within the perspective of fight against terrorism. Even after the September
11 attacks, NATO put the Article V into action for the first time in its history. These
examples can be increased. The important point is that today, international relations
are dominantly determined between terrorism and the states struggle against
terrorism; not between East and West, or NATO and Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it can
be said that terrorism, which was method of “freedom fighters” and some states to
implement their policies previously, can be seen as a non-state actor giving a route to
the world politics.
New non-state actor, global terrorism started to rise under the name of ‘New
Terrorism’ with its special characteristics. It does not completely resemble with
nationalist, religious, state-sponsored, right wing or anarchist terrorism (Karagöz,
2002: 156). It can be said that new terrorism is both mixed of them and completely
different from them. Main aim is to change or demolish world order (Whine, 2001).
While pursuing this aim, they are not restricted by anybody and they can freely use
any methods and any weapons, including WMD, whatever they want (Hoffman,
2001). Thus, dangers of the new kind of the threat are terrifying. As Laqueur argues,
no society can fully protect all its members from such kind of terrorist attacks
(Laqueur, 2001: 80). To be able to control or to prevent terrorism is very hard
because it turned into an actor in world politics. From now on, it is not a tool of
11
actors but it became an actor. It is the evolution from being a tool to the actorness.
Third world countries some of which were under the authority of communism in
previous years suffered because they cannot manage to establish their social order
due to terrorism. On the other hand, for the West, especially, for the U.S., new terror
became a candidate for taking the place of communism.
From the perspective of terrorism, it needed to renew itself and adjust to the
globalism. One polar disappeared and the other side was still standing. It must be
defeated and disappeared because merely overcoming hegemon can change system.
So as to accomplish this aim, terrorism decided to exploit the benefits of globalism
(Nacos, 2002: 11) and attached new dimensions and peculiarities to its configuration.
Global developments in recent years have helped terrorism to shape its modern face
because they live in a global world (Roy, 2001). Diffusion of information technology
and advanced communication, increased ease of movement across international
boundaries are the main assists of globalization to terrorism. Shortly, what is good
for international business is also good for international terrorists (Tucker, 2001).
Many experts and academicians saw these developments, and new terrorism
has been frequently identified as a major threat in the new era. Many actions and
developments proved that new terrorism would be a big headache for many states
either directly or indirectly. Chief of those actions are the 1993 World Trade Center
(WTC) bombings in New York, and related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma City
bombing; the 1998 East Africa bombings; the Tokyo sarin-gas attack in 1995,
September 11 attacks in 2001, Istanbul and Madrid bombings in 2003. These attacks
were, as Simon argues, the indications of a new and more threatening terrorism, one
that aims to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon: 2003). At this point,
12
Richard Shultz described such a big threat as one of the steps of war’s transformation
(Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5).
2.1.3. Transformation of War
Wars have been the reasons and the results of international relations. Today,
since terrorism has been shaping the world politics, as Shultz argues, struggle with
terrorism can be accepted as the last step of war. It is now generally accepted that
struggle with terrorism is war.1 Thus, distinctiveness of terrorism as a war will be
detailed.
New terrorism could be defined as a problem child who was gifted by
globalism to the world after the Cold War (Shultz, Vogt, 2003:8). Simon Serfaty
argues that there has been a renovation in the warfare with terrorism (Serfaty, 2001:
6). Even, Richard Shultz defined terrorism as the fourth step of transformation of war
(Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 5). According to Shultz, the first generation of war had been
perfected by Napoleon as classical nation-state war. This was followed by industrial-
age wars of erosion based on massive firepower as in World War I. Maneuver
warfare, introduced by the Germans in World War II and refined by the US in the
1980s, marked third generation. The last kind of war is against non-state actors and
threats. This war has its own characteristics and Martin Creveld (Creveld, 1991:224)
pointed them as follows:
* Warfare will be highly irregular, unconventional and decentralized in
approach.
                                                
1 In previous years, the states have avoided using ‘war’ word in their struggle with terrorists. Because
they have thought that war took place between two states or more. According to this idea, using the
‘war’ word against terrorists would strength terrorists’ arguments.
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* Asymmetrical operations will be employed to bypass the superior military
power.
* Both the organization operation of fourth-generation warriors will be
masked by deception, denial, stealth and related techniques of intelligence tradecraft.
* Terrorist organizations and operations will be profoundly affected by
information-age technologies.
* Modern communications and transportation technologies will have a
profound impact on this new battlefield.
* Laws and conventions of war that apply to nation-states will not constrain
terrorists and their state sponsor as they seek new and innovative means, including
WMD, to attack civilians and nonmilitary targets.
* Fourth-generation warriors, frequently in the name of religiously based
ideologies, will be remorseless enemies for the states they challenge.
* Countering terrorists and other violent non-state actors will be difficult for
armies of post-modern states.
Indeed many academicians, experts has emphasized in their researches or
analyses that new terrorism whose aim is to change world system completely is a
growing threat for all world since their capacity and tendency to steer to world
politics. Terrorism, which was also very dangerous as a tool in previous years, has
become stronger and more dangerous with the help of its new characteristics. So its
new characteristics should be understood in order to shape the danger in the minds.
2.1.4. Characteristics of New Terrorism
To identify the threat correctly, its characteristics have to be known very well.
According to David Tucker (Tucker, 2001: 1) networked structure is good place to
begin analyzing new terrorism. Terrorists are now able and willing to develop
14
network forms of organization for the same reason that businesses are.  The
information revolution, by lowering the cost of communication, allows organizations
to push functions outside a controlling hierarchical structure. Organizations can
control and approach a network form,2 a group of more or less autonomous,
dispersed entities, linked by advanced communications and perhaps nothing more
than a common purpose.
Motivating or compelling the move from hierarchy to network is the
advantages that an organization acquires it for transformation. (Karstedt, 2002: 96-
111). It becomes more flexible, adaptive and durable because of its loose
coordination with the others. This is how non-stateness builds up. This multiplies the
opportunities for the organization to learn, making it more flexible and adaptive. The
organization becomes more flexible because if one or even several of its constituent
entities are destroyed, the others carry on. As Hoffman points (Lesser, Hoffman,
1999: 41) a network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by execution. It is
called as a “leaderless resistance” (Whine, 2001). Utilizing the leaderless resistance
concept, all individuals in groups operate independently of each other, and never
report to a central headquarters or single leader for directional instruction. Since
current networks are very numerous and have a global reach, terrorism is not static
but dynamic.
Secondly, Michael Whines (Whine, 2001) states that new terrorists are
amateurs or operate on a part time basis. New terrorists can be anyone who
                                                
2 Michael Whine indicates Hamas as a case. According to him, Hamas constitutes example of the
network format, compared with, for instance, the hierarchical format of Arafat’s al-Fatah. Because,
Hamas has separated its political and military wings, and its leadership is divided between Gaza and
(until their exclusion) Jordan and now Syria. Yet, some of its political direction and most of its fund-
raising has been carried out in the US whilst its publications are partly produced in the UK. Whine
puts that Filistin al Muslima, the main Hamas paper is published in London, as is Palestine Times, the
editorial line of which is pro-Hamas . (Whine, 2001).
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sympathies to such kind of thoughts or actions and hates to his states or world
system. Furthermore, amateurs come together with the like-minded to conduct a
terrorist attack and then disband. They create ad hoc organizations to implement for
one action. After the action, they disperse. Bombings in Istanbul in November 2003
are examples of it.  Furthermore, terrorists do not receive training or other logistical
support from state sponsors but rely on networks of supporters, learning what they
need to know from publications or the World Wide Web or demobilized soldiers.
They have only an informal organizational structure and no permanent existence.
Thirdly, the networked form is assisted by the growing use of information and
communication technologies. In addition to facilitating networks, the communication
revolution also facilitates finding political and individual support, reaching the
knowledge and resources as well money that all terrorist organizations must do. The
declining cost and increasing ease of communicating over great distances means that
terrorist groups have greatly increased the potential pool of resources they can draw
on. They can now more easily appeal to an ethnic or religious diasporas or to
political sympathizers around the world (Elçi, 2002). They can also more easily get
their message to a worldwide audience or to the people of the country or countries
they deem most important in their struggle. Through the internet, they have access to
important sources of the information. Paul Pillar alleges that computers and satellite
phones have become a standard equipment in terrorists groups (Pillar, 2001: 47).
Moreover, the know-how for making nuclear weapons is increasingly available over
internet (Perry, 2001: 226).
Fourthly, the new terrorism does not confine itself to any boundaries and
possesses a terrifying lethality. The new terrorism tends to go for the highest possible
body count, (e.g., the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995; the WTC bombing, 1993; and
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the Tokyo sarin gas attack, 1995; September 11 attacks, 2001 and two attacks in
Istanbul, 2003). Of more than 10000 incidents of international terrorism recorded
since 1968, only 14 prior to the September 11 had resulted in 100 or more fatalities
(Jenkins, 2001: 4). Hoffman shows that although the total volume of terrorist
incidents worldwide has declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents
with fatalities has increased (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 11). According to the RAND-
St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, a record 484 international
terrorist incidents were recorded in 1991, the year of the Gulf War, followed by 343
incidents in 1992, 360 in 1993, 353 in 1994, falling to 278 incidents in 1995 and to
only 250 in 1996. Indeed, the 1996 total was the lowest annual tally in 23 years.
However, this declining was not reflected reducing the number of the fatalities. On
the contrary, 1996 was one of the bloodiest years on record. A total of 510 persons
were killed: 223 more than in 1995 and 91 more than in 1994. In fact, apart from the
September 11, the 1996 death toll ranks as the fourth highest recorded in the
chronology since it was monitoring international terrorism in 1968.3
According to Hoffman, there are some reasons accounts for terrorism’s
increased lethality (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 13). First is that, terrorists want to attract
more attention than earlier and do more dramatic in order to get their point across.
Second terrorists have profited from past experience of their friends and have
become more adept at killing. Third, meeting of new motivations, adversaries, and
means (tactics) leads to higher lethality levels. The ideological nature of the
terrorists’ causes lead to an ‘unlimited’ nature of their operations. Lastly, the
proliferation of amateurs taking part in terrorist acts has also contributed to
terrorism’s increasing lethality because the means and methods of terrorism can be
                                                
3 The reason of excluding September 11 is to be able to show emerge and the evolution of New
Terrorism until the September 11 attacks.
17
easily obtained at bookstores, from mail-order publishers, on CD-ROM, or over the
Internet.
Fifth characteristic is that the new terrorists are mostly religious motivated.
They differ from politically motivated terrorism (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02:5).
Jenkins asserts that this shift is significant because those convinced that they have the
mandate of God to kill heir foes have fewer moral doubts about mass murder and
care less about people (Jenkins, 2001: 4-5). For 1995, Hoffman's data shows that
religiously motivated terrorists were responsible for a quarter of all incidents in that
year, but caused nearly 60 percent of all fatalities (Lesser, Hoffman, 1999: 16).
Moreover, he says that in 1996, the last year for which he has data, 'Groups driven in
whole or in part by a salient religious or theological motive committed 10 of the 13
most lethal terrorists attacks'. Especially Islamic groups are dominant in the number
of the international terrorist organizations. Ayşe Hür gives the information that 27 of
53 organizations, which are in the list of the international terrorist organization,
express themselves as an Islamic (Hür, 2003). Although jihadists are a significant
problem, the threat of intensified violence posed by terrorists motivated by other
radical religious traditions, including the American Christian Patriot movement,
Israel's Jewish messianic militants and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, increased. All these
share a worldview characterized by a life-or-death struggle with the 'other' in order to
redeem the world. They die for the God. It can be concluded that religious
motivation is pushing terrorists beyond nationalistic sensation.
Sixth, the new terrorists frequently do not claim responsibility for the action
and may even deny it. The new terrorist intends to strike without publicity for
himself or his cause, until he is caught. He does not need to claim responsibility
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perhaps because he acknowledges only God as his master, and God has seen his
action. Due to having no anxiety of any political message and performing with only
hatred emotion, no one else matters (Küçük, 2003: 33-35). J. Stevenson states that
what derives terrorist to kill is essentially hatred unlike the classical terrorist
organizations that present their demands clearly and generally take direct
responsibility for their acts in order to make it clear to their adversaries that the
bloodletting will stop when those demands are met (Stevenson, 2001/02: 35). In a
sense, it is facing patriotism about religious within the terrorist network just like a
state.
2.1.5. Difficulties of Dealing with New Terrorism:
If states face with a threat or enemy, they take some measures for it.
Nevertheless, characteristics of ‘New Terrorism’ make very difficult to deal with it.
Loose tie and leaderless structure of organization make very difficult or more
correctly impossible to dissolve the structure of organization. Arresting one or two,
even many members of organization do not have any meaning to destroy the terrorist
organization. Moreover, since members are amateur and they generally die in their
first action, prevention of terrorist activities before performing is very complicated.
Additionally, advanced technology helps terrorists about not only concealing
their identity but also gaining materials in order to use in their actions. Terrorists,
who do not have any political purpose and are motivated by religious emotions, do
not limit themselves about death numbers in their action. More corpses mean
success. Indeed, it is the most dangerous side of new. The idea and the aim of killing
as many people as they can succeed is the main reason why new terrorism is thought
to be as primary threat in the new era. Due to this idea, it is frightened that new
terrorists are searching WMD. The action concept of new terrorists gives a hint that
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if they gain or reach such kind of weapon, they will not hesitate to use it (Alexander,
Hoenig, 2002). Experts and researchers are also of the same mind (Cameron, 1999:
51). It is alleged that terrorists seek to get such kind of weapons. Since those
materials can be obtained easily from the ex-Soviet bloc states and third world
countries, the world is extremely uneasy. In 1998, William C. Potter, administrator of
Center for Nonproliferation Studies in California, stated that there were warehouses
equal to 70,000 nuclear weapons without any protection in Russia (Küçük, 2003: 40).
According to Steve Simon, acquisition and use of WMD by a terrorist group is near a
certainty (Simon, Benjamin, 2001/02: 1-15).
Although it was pointed and warned about terrorism in whole world after the
Cold War, war on terrorism has not been succeed multilaterally because of
disagreement on what terrorism is.4 The world could not image and estimate how its
dangers and damages are and the most importantly it was not perceived as a global
threat so seriously until September 11.
2.2. September 11 in the Perspective of New Terrorism:
2.2.1. September 11 Attacks
On September 11, four terrorist groups, which were consisted of 19 men,
hijacked four airlines. Two of planes crashed into the towers of WTC, one into the
Pentagon and the last one, which could not succeed what it had aimed, targeted to the
White House. Then everything started to change in the whole world. The world was
shocked because the superpower was hit with massive casualties. New terrorism,
which emerged after the Cold War, was on the highest point of world politics
anymore. Many characteristics of it can be seen in the attacks of September 11. For
                                                
4 Nearly 109 definitions of terrorism have been made and there is no exact definition of terrorism
accepted by the whole world. (Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüt Merkezi (SAREM).2002. Küresel Terör ve
Türkiye. Ankara: ATASE Başkanlığı, 18.)
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that reason, the new terror was accepted as a global threat after those attacks. It
became the most dominant actor in the world arena, especially due to targeting the
U.S.’s homeland. If, the period between 1991 and September 11 is named as
‘incubation period’ for New Terrorism, it can be said that the birth in a real meaning
existed in the September 11.
After the attacks, everybody asked who did it. Many terrorist organizations
were suspect. Japanese Red Army took the responsibility but the government of the
U.S. and many people pointed out the Al-Qaeda (Karagöz, 2002: 152). As the time
passed, Al-Qaeda was declared as a responsible. There is no doubt that the name of
the organization is important but the characteristic and concept of the attacks are
more significant.
Firstly, loose network organization can be seen in the attacks. Certainly,
terrorists must have made a very detailed planning, but making clear about which
organization they belonged took very long time. Their leader has not been captured.
Many supporters both financially and logistically have been seized in different
countries such as Germany or Philippines.  According to Cottey, each operates
autonomously with its members not knowing the identity of other cells. The pattern
that has emerged is of a web of cells around the world that provide the intelligence
and manpower to execute these terrorist attacks (Cottey, 2002).
Second, members of these attacks are commonly amateur and they created ad
hoc organization. They met for only one action. September 11 was their first and last
action. As well, they did not take the attention of the intelligence agencies although
they had lived in the U.S. for two or three years. Shultz describes them as a ‘sleeper
agents’ (Shultz, Vogt, 2003: 10) because they waited in the place where they would
make an action ever since they were ordered. Pilot-terrorists, who used the planes
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crashed into the WTC and Pentagon, had been trained unintentionally in the U.S.
civil aviation organizations since 1999 (Millar, 2001). They were not in the terrorists
or suspicious lists.
Third, September 11 terrorists did not have any headquarters in a physical
sense. The center of a new terrorism is the internet and global cellular
communications. Karagöz alleges that the September 11 attacks were accomplished
by the help of open information (Karagöz, 2002: 162). By using the internet, they
were able to accelerate mobilization and intensify communication between members.
They reached flight plans of the airline companies and probably they might have
learned the weak or defenseless sides of the Pentagon. Although the U.S. has very
modern technology in defence technology and war industry, terrorists managed to
pass all security measures of her or they made inefficient those measures. Thanks to
using Information and Communication Technology (ICT), they could even hit
Pentagon (Cottey, 2003).
Fourth, the September 11 attacks conformed to trend of escalating lethality
even when the volume of the international terrorism declined (Jenkins, 2001: 1-15).
In the attacks, nearly 3600 people died. It shows that they targeted to murder as many
people as they could succeed. They did not limit themselves about killing that is the
most dangerous feature of the new terrorism. They must have planned their action
very carefully because they crashed into the middle of the Twin Towers, where was
one of the most crowded places of New York, with oil-full planes.
Fifthly, attacks were explicitly religious motivated. Although Islam does not
order or give permission to kill people, even it prohibits concluding life of any being,
all terrorists were Muslim. They committed suicide because they probably saw
themselves as a ‘sword of the Islam’ (Katzman, 2002). They used a faction of Islam
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as an ideology. After the attacks, in the video cassette, which belonged to some of
the terrorists, they declared that they were ready for dying for the God and they
would punish the ‘big evil’, the U.S. (Berger, 2001: 123-129).5
Lastly, no organization has taken the responsibility of attacks. At first Japanese
Red Army took but it was not insisted on this issue (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Although
Al-Qaeda was seen as a guilty for the attacks neither any member of Al-Qaeda nor
Osama Bin Laden has never taken the responsibility. However, Laden declared his
pleasures for seeing demolishing the WTC and he commented these actions as, it was
the first time the balance of terror has been close between Muslims and Americans
(Nacos, 2003: 1-16). Taking responsibility is not matter for ‘new Terrorism’ because
according to their opinion God saw their action. They did not have any anxiety to
send a message (Küçük, 2003: 33-35).
Without any declaration, the world found the responsible for the attacks. Who
was the responsible for September 11? New Terrorism. Which organization could be
so bold or could dare to hit the U.S. within the homeland and fit with the
characteristic of new terrorism? Al-Qaeda. The world accepted this name as a
responsible and within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks, the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly and the Security Council adopted two resolutions unanimously.6
Likewise, the NATO Council agreed that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty covered
these attacks.7 It was the first time such a decision about Article 5 was taken in
NATO’s history. The entire world agreed on that new terrorism was the most
dangerous threat for the world peace.
                                                
5 On the other hand, Jenkins alleges that 13 of 19 did not know it was a suicide mission (Jenkins,
2001: 1-15).
6 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/1 and UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)
7 North Atlantic Council Statement of 12 September 2001.
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Taking such big decisions showed that the whole world took some messages
from the September 11 attacks. People and states realized the seriousness of
terrorism.  Noelle Quenivet argues that  the world discovered terrorism again
(Quenivet, 2002). Taken messages were important for the future of world affairs.
2.2.2. Messages of September 11 Attacks:
All terrorist actions carry some messages (Hoffman, 1998: 41). September 11
also carried different messages. In order to understand future reaction of the world,
particularly the U.S.’s, what kind of messages was taken in different level should be
explained. Since the U.S. perceived new messages from attacks, they changed
foreign policy priorities.
With the attacks, name of the child was given and new terrorism became very
‘popular’ in the whole world. Although there had been several attacks carrying the
new terrorism’s features and many warnings were made about it, both the world and
the U.S. were acquainted with terrorism in its real meaning (Nye, 2001: 199).
However, its characteristics change, all terrorist actions want to give some messages.
September 11 attacks had own aims and messages. Reasons of the attacks can be
found in its messages.
If it is accepted that Al Qaeda did these attacks, some clear aims can be put.
First aim can said as the removal the U.S. military and thus the reduction or removal
of the U.S. interest from Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region; secondly, the
end of the U.S. pressure on and sanctions against Iraq; thirdly, the destruction of the
U.S.-Israeli alliance and strengthening of the Palestinians’ battle against Israel
(Nacos,2003: 1-16). Moreover Karagöz argues that strategic goals of the Osama Bin
Laden were that furthering the cause Islamic revolution within the Muslim world
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itself and he tried to face-to-face Islam and the U.S. (Karagöz, 2002: 159). Similarly,
Brian Jenkins asserts that Bin Laden knew that U.S. would give a fierce reply due to
the September 11 attacks. Thus, their strategy was based on provoking the U.S to
assault on Islam (Jenkins, 2001: 14). Michael Doran also alleges that polarizing the
Islamic world between the umma and regimes allied with the U.S. would help
achieve Laden’s primary goal, furthering the cause of Islamic revolution within the
Islamic world itself (Doran, 2001: 32-33). He even asserts that goal is to help his
brand of extremist Islam alive and flourishing among believers.
In a broadened perspective of terrorism not from the perspective of any terrorist
organization, own messages of new terrorism are more important than what the name
of organization is. Apart from the classical aims and messages of terrorism such as
violence, panic and drawing attention, terrorists gave some extra messages relating to
their aims to everyone for in every level while performing September 11 attacks.
These levels can be categorized as individual, state and international level.
For the citizens of the U.S. or individual level hatred was the first message.
They so hated from the Americans that they gave their own lives for killing them.
After the attacks, there were many debates in America about why they hate from the
U.S. Besides, the argument that U.S. creates such kind of terrorist attacks itself due
to its policies it carries on was started to be increasingly spoken while searching the
hatred against the U.S. Fear, insecurity was the second message in this level. These
attacks showed that Americans are not completely in a safe in their homeland. Just
before the September 11 attacks, Pillar stated that American homeland is the best
place to inflict fear on Americans (Pillar, 2001: 58). Until the September 11, most
Americans were clearly believing that U.S. had very good measures of protection
from its enemies because oceans to the east and west and friendly neighbors to the
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north and south had given a security from dangers. Most of the Americans will not
get rid of the September 11 syndrome (Halliday, 2001: 256). It is not wrong to say
that Americans faced with the realities of the world (Howard, 2002).
For the U.S. government or state level, vulnerability of the U.S. can be
perceived as the first message. These attacks deteriorated the image of superpower
by hitting homeland although this superpower has extremely big and strong military
power. Punishment can be pointed as a second message at this stage. With relating to
hatred, they tried to prove that policies of the U.S., which were not liked by them,
would eventually be punished (Baranovsky, 2002: 21-28). Additionally, that
terrorists tried to punish the U.S. in all fields could be seen in their target selections.
White House carried political message, Pentagon carried military message and WTC
carried economic message. In classical total war, war has military, economic and
political aims. If one state is wanted to be defeated completely in a strategic level, its
military and economic structures must be demolished so that enemy can be captured
in political level.8 September 11 itself carried these messages on itself. As for the
world or on international level, terrorism confirmed that it was the most dangerous
enemy, which could use every kind of method to accomplish its aims. It also mean
that such terrorist attacks may be executed in any country since it dared to assault to
superpower because there is no authority who has capability to prevent or control the
terrorism. After the attacks, French President Jacques Chirac said “This time it was
New York; next time it could be Paris, Berlin or London.” (Serfaty, 2001: 8).
Istanbul and Madrid bombings were proved this view. “United against terrorism”
became the leading word in international affairs.
                                                
8 The level of the total war can be found in Field Manuel, MT 145-1 Müşterek Harekat Talimnamesi.
2001. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi.
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The challenge can be perceived as the most important message at the
international level since it attacked the only polar of unipolar world system.
September 11 proved that weak non-state actors can strike hard against even the
strongest of today’s nation. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet
Union, no country could balance American military power. According to Joseph Nye
in the September 11 attacks, terrorists tried to prove that this balance could be
supplied (Nye, 2001: 200). September 11 showed that the weak balanced the strong
and weak was not as weak as the U.S. thought. Each ‘successful’ terrorist operation
against the U.S. demonstrates that it is vulnerable; it is not the hegemonic power of
the world (Pillar, 2001: 56). Terrorists’ aim that is to remind the U.S. that they are
not the only powerful actor in the international arena became successful and
terrorism took the non-state actor role for world affairs. Indeed, due to this
challenging message, U.S.’s policy started to change and the world became anxious
about how the U.S. would give a reply to terrorists’ challenge.
Apart from the all aims, messages and reasons; conclusions of the attacks are
the most important side for the world level. They triggered to change of international
system. There had been many terrorist activities in the world targeting to Americans
until September 11. For example, terrorists drove a truck filled with explosives into
the basement of the WTC in New York City in 1993, followers of Osama Bin Laden
killed American soldiers in an ambush on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993,
the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was destroyed by a tanker-truck bomb
in 1996, US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously attacked by truck
bombs in 1998 and the USS Cole was attacked in the port city of Yemen in 2000.9
But on the one point, the September 11 differentiated from those attacks as well as its
                                                
9 In those terrorist attacks totally 361 people were killed.
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death toll. Targeting homeland of the U.S. is the most significant side because
everybody knew that eventually the U.S. would normally respond and punish
someone for these actions. Additionally, the U.S., would probably use and change
this bad situation for the benefit of its interests due to overcoming the shock. At this
point it can be said that September 11 attacks have given the U.S. the opportunity to
attempt to hold the international arena under its leadership according to American
priorities. So the world started to wait how the U.S. would respond September 11. In
addition to terrorism fear, U.S. policy against this challenge became another anxiety
of the states.
As a result, new terrorism, which appeared in the beginning of 1990s,
developed and became an actor in the international arena. September 11 is a solid
evidence for this idea. The emergence of new terrorism is a significant and new
development in international politics because for the first time a terrorist organization
with global pretensions has emerged and shown that it is capable of undertaking a
campaign of violence against any states. Two aspects of new terrorism made it a
worldwide actor; first is its global characteristics different from classical terrorism,
second is targeting the homeland of U.S. with the September 11.
Now, threat of new terrorism is the most famous, well-known and active actor
in the world arena. Due to the respond of the U.S., everybody knew that the world
would never be the same again.  Nobody was mistaken on this issue. The U.S. started
from the Afghanistan. Then government prepared a new NSS for ‘war against
terrorism’. The new strategy of the U.S. will be clarified in the next chapter in order
to show the direction of the current U.S.’s policies.
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CHAPTER III:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE U.S. AFTER
 THE SEPTEMBER 11
September 11 marked the start of a new era in American strategic thinking. The
terrorist attacks have had an impact comparable to the Pearl Harbor attack on
December 7, 1941, that propelled the U.S. into World War II. Attacks changed both
the U.S.’s war strategy with terrorism and its priorities concerning foreign and
security policies. After the September 11, all Americans were convinced that new
terrorism was new threat. War on terrorism has become the U.S.’s number one
priority for foreign policy. Moreover, offensive policies started to be applied against
terrorism instead of defensive ones. Such policies have affected foreign and global
security policies of the U.S.
In this chapter, the changing strategy of the U.S. against terrorism and its
reflections to the American security and foreign polices will be explained. In order to
clarify the roots of current policies of the U.S.’s, firstly struggle of the U.S. with
terrorism before September 11 will be explained. For many times, U.S. declared that
they were in a war with terrorism. The defensive war method they used, their point of
view about terrorism will be clarified. Secondly, changing minds about terrorism,
decisions and measures for a war will be clarified. After the September 11, U.S.
realized that terrorism could be very dangerous for the people of the U.S. and took
some decisions for fighting with new type of terrorism. New Terrorism may have
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taken the place of communism for foreign policy of the U.S. New type of enemy
necessities new strategy since other previous methods did not work against it.
Therefore, method had to be changed. Thirdly, characteristics and main parameters
of the emerging new security strategy of the U.S. will be explained. It is worth noting
that corrects or errors; neither negative nor positive critics to this strategy will not be
analyzed. In other words, this research does not take normative stance with respect to
American security. Only what the U.S. says in the strategy is tried to be clarified to
draw the frame of war on terrorism. Lastly, selection of the U.S. to implement the
NSS will be shown. For proving her seriousness, U.S. started to carry out her
strategy in the Middle East, which is the convenient place to begin war against
terrorism according to her priorities and opinion.
3.1. Struggle of the U.S. with Terrorism before September 11
As said by Paul Pillar, combating international terrorism had been one of the
major objectives of the U.S. (Pillar, 2001: i) because in an average, 26 Americans
had been killed per year by terrorists before September 11 (Office of Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, 2000: 1). George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence, argues in
2001 that the U.S. remained a number one target of international terrorism.
According to numbers provided by him, close to one-third of all incidents worldwide
in 2000 were directed against Americans. (Hoffman, 2001: 2). For that reason, there
had also been a war against terrorism in previous years. In this part strategy of the
U.S. against terrorism before September 11 will be clarified in order to putting
differences with current policies.
Especially after the Cold War, ‘war against terrorism’ has been heard more
frequently. The commitment to the fight against terrorism was reflected in the
statements of national leaders about the persistence and fortitude that the fight would
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require. For instance, Clinton stated in 1998 that the U.S. was in “a long, ongoing
struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism”.10
Opinions polls also showed the public support for counter terrorism. In a survey done
in 1998, Americans cited international terrorism more often than any other issue as a
critical threat to U.S.’s vital interests (Rielly, 1999: 15-16)11. In the same poll, 79
percent of the public said that fighting international terrorism should be a very
important goal of the U.S. Thus, before September 11 the U.S. also used some
methods against terrorism. Indeed, there are two different ways to struggle with
terrorism; anti-terrorism and counterterrorism (Akgün, 2001: 117). Anti-terrorism
means to take only some measures against the terrorist actions in order to minimize
the risks for the public. On the other hand, counterterrorism comes to mean showing
more active and aggressive attitude to suppress terrorist activities. It includes using
physical force to destroy terrorist organization12. In this perspective, pre-September
11 period the method used was anti-terrorism. Its measures can be listed as
economic, financial, political measures and sanctions, diplomatic pressure,
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation and lastly military measures. They did
not include major foreign policy transformations.
Believing that terrorism was one of the threats for the U.S., governments took
some drastic measures for struggle against it. American analysts believed that new
terrorism would persist for many years in the future and according to Simon and
Benjamin, the resources, which the U.S. had devoted to combating the threat of
                                                
10 Address to the nation by President Bill Clinton, August 20, 1998. This address is available online at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/strike/clinton980820.ahtr (December 20, 2002).
11 This survey was conducted between October and December 1998. In August 1998, the U.S.
embassies were bombed. For that reason, it may partly reflected feeling emerged with the bombings.
However, it also showed that after such kind of attacks, American people could highly support the
counter terrorism activities and measures.
12 More detailed information about the measures against terrorism can be found in Field Manuel Kara
Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı. 1998. İç Güvenlik Harekatı KKT 31-2 (Internal Security Operation). Ankara:
K.K. Basımevi.
31
terrorism, reflected this view (Simon and Benjamin, 2000:59). In terms of financial
measures, as said by them, the U.S. had doubled what it spent to fight terrorism since
1994, to more than $ 10 billion for fiscal year 2000. Already, the U.S. spent $ 1.4 bn
each year on defensive measures against terrorist use of Chemical Biological
Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In 1998, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) director Louis Freeh made terrorism the top priority and his counterterrorism
budget grew to $ 423 million by 2001 (Nye, 2001: 200). The U.S. had also frozen of
assets belonging to individual terrorists, terrorist groups, or state sponsor and the
prohibition of material support to terrorists.
In terms of diplomatic pressure, although it had a problem to take some strict
measures against to terrorism, diplomacy was seen a method for fighting against
terrorism by the U.S. Resolution 731 in the security council of UN against Libya and
Resolution 1267 against the Afghanistan could be seen as a diplomatic sample of
anti-terrorism efforts. Libya was enforced to make a cooperation to find responsible
of the Pan Am action. Afghanistan was imposed a sanction to turnover the Osama
bin Laden. Moreover, U.S. decided to take strict measures against some states, which
were giving support to the international terrorism. She imposed four main sets of
U.S. Government sanctions: A ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over
exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or
services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability
or ability to support terrorism, prohibitions on economic assistance; and imposition
of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.
In the state level, the U.S. amended some criminal laws. According to Stephen
Flynn, application of criminal law had become an increasingly large part of U.S.
efforts to anti-terrorism (Flynn, 2001: 191-193). Long sentences have the most
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important side of this method. For instance Ramzi Yousef, who attacked the WTC in
1993, was sentenced to 240-year.
Intelligence and covert actions were other options for combating terrorism. The
anti-terrorism contribution most often expected from intelligence is to detect
terrorists’ plots in time for measures to be taken to remove threat. Once terrorists
attacks occurs intelligence tackles with to determine responsibility for the crime and
to locate and capture the perpetrators. FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
were used for these purposes in the phase of anti-terrorism. George Tenet stated in
February 2000 that the U.S. agencies had assisted in the rendition of more than two
dozen terrorists since July 1998.13 Moreover, he claimed that the counter-terrorism
center at the CIA was strengthened and coordination between that agency and the
FBI was improved.14
Regarding to military measures, retaliation has been the most important anti-
terrorism method used by U.S. military force (Pillar, 2001: 100). As Paul Pillar
indicates, she first employed it for this purpose against Libya in 1986 in response to
the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin on April 4. American casualties at the nightclub
included two killed and seventy-nine wounded. The U.S. response on April 14 was a
strike by one hundred combat aircraft based on carriers or in the United Kingdom.
The targets were several military sites in and around Tripoli and Benghazi as well as
numerous surface-to-air missile installations. The second retaliatory use was against
Iraq for having unsuccessfully attempted to use agents to assassinate Bush Senior
while he was visiting Kuwait in April 1993. The retaliatory strike on June 26,
twenty-three Tomahawk cruise missiles were used, aimed at the headquarters of the
                                                
13 The statement is available online at http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/speechs/dci_speech-
020200.htlm (December 21, 2002)
14 However, the September 11 investigation showed that this coordination and cooperation could not
be succeeded.
33
intelligence service in Baghdad. Third instance was a set of strikes on August 20,
1998 against targets associated with Osama bin Laden, in response to the bombings
U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Several dozen cruise missiles were
fired. Most of the missiles were targeted to eastern Afghanistan and some of them
were targeted to Sudan. American sentiments about retaliation were reflected in
another poll: 74 percent of the public and 77 percent of the smaller sample of leaders
said they would support retaliatory air strikes against terrorists (Rielly, 1999: 27).
Moreover, 57 percent of the public and 58 percent of the leaders even expressed
support for the use of ground troops to respond to terrorist attacks.
Although these measures were taken and conducted, terrorist activities
continued. Indeed financial, diplomatic, intelligence and criminal laws are standard
measures which are taken by every country dealing with terrorism. For that reason, it
may be wrong to expect that those measures would stop or control terrorism. They
have not deterred the terrorists. Retaliation was perceived more concrete method for
preventing or stopping terrorist activities for U.S. governments. Nevertheless, it
could not be named as the perfect method of fighting with terrorism. Michael Hirsh
indicates the inefficiency of this method and he claims, periodic cruise-missile
strikes of Bill Clinton only seemed to encourage Bin Laden, who derided the U.S. as
a ‘paper tiger’ (Hirsh, 2002). American retaliations can be perceived as a ‘make-up’
or ‘reactionary approach’ for mollifying own public opinion. If terrorists hit one, the
U.S. hit back one or two.15 Retaliation means defense. In the perspective of this
explanation, it is not wrong to say that U.S. used anti-terrorism method before
September 11.
                                                
15 The Turkish army used the same method while struggling with PKK before 1993. Troops were
waiting in the stations and if they were attacked, they would start to defense. But this method was
given up for taking the concrete successes against terrorists.
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All samples and experiences about fighting against terrorism have showed that
defender never wins unless it attacks. Nevertheless, it was very difficult to apply
more rigorous methods because public had to be convinced. Some terrorism experts
emphasized that more strict and assertive measures had to be taken to prevent
terrorism activities in the U.S. before September 11. They had noticed that new
terrorism became very dangerous actor for its unique characteristics for only
superpower. In February 2001, George Tenet put the Osama bin Laden as the most
dangerous threat for the U.S. (Nye, 2001: 198). Nye also showed that, a June 2000
report of the National Commission on Terrorism urged that “number one priority”
should be given to the terrorism. However, it was very difficult to convince people
into taking further steps. It was also very hard to activate enthusiasm for dramatic
increasing in spending for counterterrorism. Richard Clark, antiterrorism official
handling terrorism at the National Security Council (NSC) for both the Clinton and
George W. Bush administrations, stated in an interview in 1999, “There is problem
convincing person that there is a threat. There is disbelief and resistance. Most
people do not understand.” According to Shultz, in addition to the public, U.S.
intelligence community did not grasp the implications of terrorism. Moreover, he
argues that Pentagon and State Department wanted nothing to do with such risky
military operations and fought bureaucratically to block them (Shultz, 2003: 23).
That is to say, the U.S. war strategy against terrorism based on defensive
methods and those methods did not require major alterations in its global security
and foreign policies until September 11 attacks.
3.2. War against New Terrorism after the September 11
September 11 became a turning point for method and strategy of the U.S. used
against terrorism, which is now clearly perceived as a threat for national and
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international, as well as grand transformation in its global security and foreign policy
priorities. Thomas Kuhn alleges that crisis is a precondition for emerging new
methods used for solving problems (Kangas, 2003: 6). September 11 attacks are that
crisis for the U.S. After the attacks, American people were convinced -- complaint
issue of terrorism experts of the U.S. -- with terrible experience. Everybody suddenly
understood the dimensions of threat. Public opinion, administration and international
actors agreed on the seriousness of the terrorism. New method had to be found for
fighting with terrorism. This search was immediately started and it turned towards
using force harshly. Anti-terrorism strategy became counterterrorism and defensive
methods were replaced by offensives. Moreover, terrorism sat the first place of
foreign policy’s agenda.
On the domestic front, the administration sought and received a joint resolution
from Congress authorizing use of military force, in the exercise of legitimate self-
defense. In the language of the resolution: "The President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States...." (Lieber, 2002: 4). The resolution passed by a
margin of 98-0 in the Senate and 420-1 in the House of Representatives. David
Gombert argues that public opinion, which had been deeply divided since the
November 2000 presidential election, rallied in broad support not only of the war
effort, but also of the President himself (Gompert, 2001: 8-14). Alan Wolfe clarifies
that the terrorist attacks have united Americans as at no time since World War II
(Wolfe, 2001: 283).
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Second, the U.S. sought and received a unanimous U.N. Security Council vote
on September 28. Resolution 1373 -- adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
that provides wide authority for the Security Council to enforce its decision and
makes the resolution binding for all U.N. member countries -- requires all member
states to criminalize Al-Qaeda financial activities, share intelligence information, and
take measures to prevent the movement of terrorists. While the resolution has a more
symbolic than practical effect, it provides multilateral legitimacy for the American-
led battle against terrorism (Lieber, 2002: 4). Lastly, the 19 members of NATO
invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the
alliance. Article V treats an attack on one member state as an attack on all, and
requires that they take action under their respective constitutional procedures.
From the explanations of President and other members of administration, it can
be concluded that firstly, military methods, not the international law, would make
this war. Secondly, war would be in all over the world until terrorism was finished.
President Bush proclaimed in his speech to Congress, “our war on terror begins with
Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (Stevenson, 2001/02: 35). Lastly,
main method must have been counterterrorism not anti-terrorism (Akgün, 2001:
117).
All these showed that new enemy of the U.S. henceforth was New Terrorism.
In the history, U.S. had designated her enemy within perspective of ideologies, ideas
and symbols such as Hitler, genocide, totalitarianism and communism (Gökay, 2002:
14-35). New Terrorism became new symbol for the U.S. The new black and white
areas were defined as being with the U.S. or with terrorists. On 20 September, the
president Bush told Congress “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
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make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist”16 (Homontree, 2003).
Indeed, this is a great example of changing patterns of the U.S. global foreign and
security policies. The gravity of this enemy is amplified by two additional factors.
One is raised fears about potential use of WMD the other is ‘rouge states’ (Lieber,
2002: 2). It can be said that definition and perception of terrorism were developed
with the participation of ‘rouge states’ and WMD. The biggest fear for the U.S. was
the meeting of this trio against to the U.S. (Koç, 2003: 1).
Struggle with terrorism generally is not evaluated as a ‘war’. Similarly, at the
beginning there was no consensus on how to define the September 11 attacks and
response to them. For instance, soon after the attacks, President Bush described the
events of September 11 at first as “apparent terrorist attack on the U.S.”, however on
the next day he called them acts of war (Karagöz, 2002: 142). Later description took
on a shape rapidly. Bush explained that attacks meant to declaration a war against the
U.S. and “this war would be the first war of 21st century” (Mandelbaum, 2001: 254).
This was the counter-declaration of war for the U.S. Likewise, soon after the attacks
great majority of the media declared that U.S. was in a war (Gökdağ, 2001: 4).
In that case, the kind of war is important. In Field Manuel Müşterk Harekat MT
145-1 (Joint Operation), kinds of war are defined as this order: non-war operation,
deterrence, shaping of security environment, crisis management, use of limited force
and war with a definite result (Müşterek Harekat MT 145-1, 2001: 1-25). In this
perspective, taking a decision of the U.S. for war with terrorism can be matched with
the war with a definite result since all clues and the way thing were going showed
that very huge power would be used.
                                                
16 According to Brzezinski, this sentence was used ninety-nine times after the attacks at the
government level. "New American Strategies for Security and Peace" conference in November 4,
2003. Full text of speech can be found in http://www.newamericanstrategies.org (December 5, 2003).
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There is no doubt that this war would not be like and be conventional war
(Clark, 2001: 242). Characteristics of New Terrorism would not give permission
people to fight against it with traditional war methods. This war would be very
difficult for the U.S. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay define war against terrorism, as
“like the fight against Soviet communism, campaign against terrorism will be nasty,
brutish and long” (Daalder and Lindsay, 2001: 403) due to the characteristics of non-
state actor. As Shultz explains, this war will be fourth-generation war17 (Shultz,
2003: 23).
If threat and enemy were designated and if there would be a war, method had to
be decided. Method of deterrence had already used against ‘rouge states’ but it
worked at all. Deterrence and other options apart from military could not be
successful. For example in Afghanistan, diplomatic pressures and law enforcement
efforts to arrest Bin Laden have not worked. (Quenivet, 2002). The U.S. must have
decided, as Brzezinski pointed, to apply more strict methods including use of force
(Brzezinski, 2001: 212-214).
The method the U.S. decided to use can be matched with ‘area control’.18 Main
concepts of this method are that searching the terrorists in the suspected areas; after
finding and cleaning them, keeping some troops in the same field for impeding
terrorist to use there again (İç Güvenlik Harekatı KKT 31-2, 1998: 4-66). It also
includes that every risky region must be taken under the control and in some mixed
periods troops walk around there.19 Main aim of the method is to capture terrorists
and/or to make ineffective them. Therefore, this suspected and risky region cannot
                                                
17 The characteristics of the fourth-generation war were explained in the first chapter page 9.
18 While evaluating the method of ‘area control’, it should be considered that U.S. is a superpower or
hegemon. For that reason, area may include whole world and it should be thought at the global level.
The area should be considered as the world.
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create any threat for anybody as long as it is controlled. In the core of concept,
attacker always has an advantage contrary to defender. Paul Pillar reminds it with
famous sentence; ‘the offense knows where it will strike, but the defense does not’
(Pillar, 2001: 59). Donald Rumsfeld remarked about this issue: “A terrorist can
attack at any time at any place using a range of techniques. It is physically
impossible to defend at every time in every location.... The only effective way to
defend is to take the battle to where the terrorists are.... So preemption with military
force is now an operative idea.” (Lieber, 2002: 4). Taking and preserving initiative,
and striking first is the most important rule in the battlefield. Moreover, if strict
measures and military options are not thought, public may have started to ask why
the U.S. has so big army since, armed forces exists for such critical decisions. In
2000, National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice beforehand verified this opinion
by saying “The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It
is not a political referee. Military force is best used to support clear political
objectives” ( Freedman, 2001/02: 75).
For establishing ‘area control’ method, the U.S. government started to activate
the project of defense institutions’ transformation, which had been planed before
September 11 attacks (Kangas, 2003: 7-12). Jack Kangas points phases of project as
follows: to protect U.S.’s homeland and military bases abroad, to envisage troops for
far threats and reinforce them, to determine enemy shelter, to establish information
web, to use information technology for more effective joint operations and lastly
protecting ability related to the space.
In the perspective of ‘area control’, the plan of the U.S. can be categorized in
two levels. Short-term level is to make criminal investigation and punish them. This
                                                                                                                                         
19 How the method of ‘Area Control’ was performed by the Turkish Military Forces clearly explained
in the book of Osman Pamukoğlu. 2003. Unutulanlar Dışında Yeni Bir Şey Yok (There is no new thing
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phase can be named as Post-action hot reply. In the long-term level, they have
searched roots and turned their terrorism policy direction to the Middle East.
Transformation of the Middle East according to U.S.’s priorities is necessitated. This
second level changed global foreign and security policies of the U.S.
First step of the new method was Afghanistan operation. The U.S. believed that
without operation in Afghanistan, the terrorist network of Al-Qaeda would be intact
(Quenivet, 2002).  On several occasions, the U.S. had requested the government of
Afghanistan, the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan had
nevertheless refused even after the Security Council of the UN had passed
resolutions demanding his extradition. The administration launched the first phase of
its military campaign on October 7, by bombing targets in Afghanistan with British
force. Land forces were also used and after the operation, troops were located to the
Afghanistan that is the necessities of ‘area control’. Indeed this operation was very
comprehensive. According to Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, it had three
components: Kosovo-style strategic bombing of military targets to weaken the
Taliban’s power, Somalia-like commando raids to wipe out the terrorists and
Nicaragua-like support for the Taliban’s adversaries, especially the Northern
Alliance (Daalder and Lindsay, 2001: 404).
In fact, it can be said that this strategy became very successful at the beginning.
Soon after the Afghanistan operation, Syria was trying to promote herself as an
example of counterterrorism success, Iran was becoming nervous and President
Khatami assured that Iran would not harbor any terrorist group and that members of
Al-Qaeda arrested and sent back to their country. Sudan started to cooperate with the
                                                                                                                                         
except forgotten). İstanbul.
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U.S. while Yemen and Philippines invited U.S. troops for military support and
advice. These examples can be thought as the products of new method.
As to other measures, financial, legal and diplomatic methods were also revised
and reinforced. Nevertheless, they would not be main ways for struggling terrorism.
They would be assistant methods to support military option. These measures were
mostly internal. In September 20, Tom Ridge was appointed head of new Office of
Homeland Security by the White House (Zakariaa, 2001: 310)20. Brigitte Nacos gives
some numbers as; in the four months following the events of September 11, 98
percent of all bills, resolutions and amendments proposed by the House of
Representatives and 97 percent by the Senate related to terrorism. Moreover, the
president Bush issued 12 Executives Orders and 10 Presidential Proclamations
related to attacks (Nacos, 2003: 3). As to financial measures, the 2003 Pentagon
budget was set at $ 379 billion – a 15 percent increase over the 2002 budget. This
budget is 93 percent as high as the average annual expenditure during the Cold War
decade of 1980s (Conetta, 2002: 3). $45 billion was reserved for counterterrorism
activities (Hür, 2003). Samples can be increased but important thing is these
measures have been perceived sub-methods to support the main method; use of force.
From the beginning, however, the president Bush has been explicit in saying
that the war against terror will not be quickly completed. In a one-year after attacks,
special features of new war appeared clearly. They had to be depended on a security
strategy. So continuity of the ‘war against’ terrorism could be reinforced and
administration was able to explain the direction of her policies. Moreover, some
perceived this war as a credibility of the U.S. (Serfaty, 2001: 10-11). Therefore, the
                                                
20 The Homeland Security Council consist of the president, the vice president and key cabinet
members and agency heads, who will advise and assist the president on all aspects of the homeland
security.
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U.S. could not afford loosing against the terrorists as the superpower that would
mean loosing the status as the mega power.
3.3. American New Security Strategy:
If new enemy was identified as new terrorism, foreign policy of the U.S. had to
be oriented according to the new enemy’s characteristics. The strategies that won the
Cold War—containment and deterrence—will not work against the new terrorism,
because those strategies assumed the existence of identifiable regimes, enemies and
territories (Gaddis, 2002). Therefore, security strategy or the “Grand Strategy” had to
be renewed again. The new NSS of the U.S. is going to be analyzed in the next
paragraphs to find the change in the U.S. foreign and security policy due to the
terrorism.
3.3.1. What is the National Security Strategy?
 Before analyzing NSS, firstly the meaning of the NSS is explained in order to
show its importance in American policies. “Grand strategy” is the term describing
how a country will use various means she possesses -- military, economic, political,
technological, ideological, and cultural -- to protect and promote its overall security,
values, and national interests (Lieber, 2002). As for the U.S., according to section
603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 -- codified at 50 United
States’ Constitution (U.S.C.) 404a --, the President of U.S. is required to transmit to
Congress each year a “comprehensive report on the NSS of the United
States”(Lieber, Lieber, 2002: 32). The goal of the NSS report is to outline the global
interests, goals, and objectives of the U.S. that are vital to its national security.
According to Haine and Lindström, the NSS document represents a broad
collection of different sensibilities and offers a tentative synthesis of diverse beliefs
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of American officials inside the administration. In the document, it is relatively easy
to map out these various views expressed by several Departments, notably Defense
and State. The NSS is not merely a formal exercise; in practice, it serves as a
reference and justification for actual policy choices (Haine and Lindström, 2004).
Namely, security strategies are dominant factor of the American policies. Since
1986, 12 reports have been published; two during the second Reagan administration
(1987, 1988), three in the George Bush Senior Administration (1990, 1991, 1993),
six in the Clinton administration (1994-1999), and one by the current Bush
Administration (2002).  These strategies have drawn the path of the U.S. foreign
policies.
3.3.2. Historical Background of New Security Strategy:
According to Charles Kupchan, candidate George Bush won the election by
promising to pursue a more “humble” foreign policy, to scale back America’s
international commitments, to be more selective and to focus more attention on her
own hemisphere (Kupchan, 2003: 221). He also adds that after the elections, Bush
generally adhered to these promises. During his first months, Bush drew down U.S.
troops’ levels in Bosnia and reduced America’s role as a mediator in many different
regional conflicts.
On the other side, a report of European Union (EU) commission21 alleges that
while designing defense and security program, the new Administration has
developed a new defense and security strategy with far-reaching international
consequences. According to this report speeches by the President and the Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, and a number of program documents, set out a distinctly
unilateralist option. The concepts developed subsequently have already been implied
                                                
21 Prepared by the Political Committee of the EU. June 2003. “Europe and New United States
National Security Strategy,” Document A/1819.
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in "Rebuilding America's Defenses" (2000), and the Quadrennial Defense Review
Report (QDR) (2001): unilateral military intervention, with or without UN backing,
US decision-making on the basis of national interests, pre-emptive warfare,
coalitions of the willing and so on. Similarly, John Ikenberry asserts that in its first
six mounts in office, Bush administration signaled towards more unilateral position.
It rejected series of international treaties and agreements -- such as Kyoto protocol,
the International Criminal Court, the Biological Weapons Convention, UN action on
the trade in small arms -- and championed missile defense and its desire to repeal
anti-ballistic missile treaty ( Ikenberry, 2001/02: 20).
Before September 11, the Bush administration had been in the process of
developing a new NSS. This was taking place through the Quadrennial Defense
Review as well as in other places. On 30 September 2001, soon after the September
11 attacks, the Bush administration released the congressionally mandated 2001
QDR. The new QDR establishes four functional goals for America's armed forces
(QDR-01, p. iii-iv): Assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military
competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and decisively
defeating any adversary should deterrence fail. QDR puts a distinctive emphasis on
war-fighting and war-fighting capabilities. It aims for the decisive defeat of
adversaries. It defines quite ambitiously in terms of "changing the regime of an
adversary state" and occupying "foreign territory until U.S. strategic objectives are
met." (QDR-01, p. 13).
During the one-year period between 2001 and 2002, administration of the U.S.
started to prepare a new security doctrine. All speeches of Bush and other
administrators formed the roots of the new strategy. Even, this doctrine is defined by
the Philip Zerikow as a more comprehensive articulation of themes that the President
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Bush had already begun to introduce in his speeches in different places (Zelikow,
2003: 17). First message related to the new strategy was the President Bush’s
remarks on September 20, 2001; “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision
to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." (Hirsh, 2002). On
6 October 2001, a new element was introduced; the U.S. would "fight evil regimes".
On 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address, Bush finally criticized the
terrorists of ‘rogue states’22: “States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an
axis of evil”.23 In addition, he stated that September 11 created unprecedented "new
deadly challenges" that necessitated new approaches and rules for statecraft on June
1, 2002, at West Point. Punishing tyrants like Iraq's Saddam Hussein as international
outlaws, the President announced, "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and
their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the U.S.
and our allies and friends.... Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against
a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of
innocents, whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death.... The greater the
threat, the greater the risk of inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively." (Kegley and
Raymond, 2003).
3.3.3. Summary of the New Security Strategy24:
The new security doctrine of the U.S., which has been orienting current
American policies, was issued on September 17, 2002. Many allege that there are no
                                                
22 The expression of ‘rouge states’ was used in the Clinton administration for states, which supported
terrorism and had a problem for this reason with the U.S. such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Cuba and Sudan.
23 ‘Axis of Evil’ consists of Iran, Iraq and North Korea.
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considerable changes in the new strategy.25 However, the biggest change lies on the
fact that anymore there is a strong motive in the strategy to implement determined
tough policies due to the September 11. Policies written only on the papers started to
become real. Because people who thought that U.S. should pursue and perform more
active and dominant policies; and who thought that new terrorism was an enemy
which had to be defeated in the new era came together on the same point. In other
words, a child, whose name had been evident, was born with the September 11
attacks and started to walk when it was twelve-month-old.
The new Strategy consists of nine chapters apart from foreword of the President
Bush. As a beginning, Bush clearly declared that new type of terrorism is the enemy
of the U.S. in the new era (NSS, 2002: i). Declaration of war against terrorism is
made and methods used in the war are put. Threats sourcing from both WMD and
weak states are pointed.
In the first section of the Strategy, the unparallel military power of the U.S. is
emphasized. It is recommended that this power be used for the encouraging balance
of power, which supports freedom (NSS, 2002: 1). So, it starts with a ‘power’
analysis before pointing out the goals. The primary goal of the strategy is identified
as to assist making the world not only safer but also better place.
In the second section, the first thing that the U.S. will do to achieve her aim is
elucidated as to defend liberty and justice for all people (NSS, 2002: 3).
The third section obviously puts that U.S. is in a global war against terrorism.
Changing features of terrorism as a threat can be seen from different aspect in this
chapter (NSS, 2002: 5). The target is shown here very clear. The terrorism and the
states, which support and give permission to terrorism activities and organizations,
                                                                                                                                         
24 Full text of the New Security Strategy is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov.nsc
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are accepted as enemies. Strategy explicitly pronounces that there will be no
distinctions between terrorists and such kind of states. Additional point is that, it is
accepted that fighting against terrorism is not same with any other war in their
history. Therefore, methods and strategies of this war will be different. The U.S.
plans to annihilate and disrupt terrorism by using all the elements of national and
international measures in order to prevent terrorists to gain or use WMD, defending
the U.S. and her interests in the whole world by multilaterally or unilaterally if
necessary, disallowing further sponsorship, support and shelter to terrorists by
convincing or coercing states. Moreover, it is implied that this war will be long and
Afghanistan was the first step of this war. The most noteworthy theme is acting
unilaterally if necessary.
The section four outlines the problematic regions and regional conflicts are
indicated. Israeli- Palestine conflict, problem between India and Pakistan, situations
of Mexico, Brazil, Canada, and Indonesia, regional conflicts in Latin America, and
problems in Africa are pointed out. Approaches of the America to these problems are
enlightened in general.
In the fifth section, characteristics of ‘rouge states’ are listed as brutalizing their
own public, no respect to the international laws and agreements, determining to have
WMD and using as a threat to the rest of the world, supporting terrorism, refusing
fundamental human values and hating the U.S and everything related with the U.S.
(NSS, 2002: 14). The U.S. government thinks that terrorists and rouge states must be
stopped before they threat to the world with WMD or use them. It is accepted that
deterrence is not a useful action against this type of enemies and threats (NSS, 2002:
15). For that reason, it is declared that preemptive actions will be used to defend
                                                                                                                                         
25 Condoleezza Rice recalls that the National Security Strategy does not overturn previous doctrines
(Rice, 2002: 6).
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national security of the U.S. Because the new Strategy believes that international
laws permit every state to apply such kind of action if there is an imminent danger of
attack.
Section six investigates the economic side of the security on the world level. It
is expressed that the global economic growth is useful for the national security.
Besides, it is emphasized that the U.S. will strengthen global energy security for her
own (NSS, 2002: 19).
In the following part, the document shows the measures and methods for repair
the income distribution and to defeat poverty in the world.
The eighth section emphasizes the international cooperation and harmony. It
also gives importance to the international institutions to use implementing America’s
strategies. Successful operations of some institutions such as NATO are mentioned.
It is pointed that new kind of alliance is required for the new era.
In the last section, some necessary adaptations of the U.S.’s institutions to the
new era are indicated. Obligation of transformation, particularly for the army, to fight
against new threats is stated. In the meantime, no state or army will be permitted to
compete with the U.S. power (NSS, 2002: 30). Another important point for the
modification, it is asserted that the U.S. will require new bases within Western
Europe and Northeast Asia (NSS, 2002: 29). It is also emphasized that this war will
not be ‘a clash of civilizations’. Aim of the U.S. for the Muslim states is expressed
battle for the future of the Muslim world.
3.3.4. Main Parameters of the New Security Strategy:
Due to being a superpower, her strategies are conducted not only for one aim
but for many. First, this new strategy must first save the superpower image of the
U.S.; second compensate for pain of the U.S. nation; third give new kind of strong
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deterrence messages to both terrorists and states, which support terrorists’ activities
and fourth solve the unsolved problems and shape the world according to desires and
priorities of the U.S. Such a strategy would provide the U.S. with the ability to
control all things and to minimize whole risks, which could be direct to interests of
the U.S. in the perspective of ‘area control’. Because a rational foreign policy
minimizes risks and maximizes benefits (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 10).
Although it consists of nine chapters, this strategy, as Kirshner points out, can be
summarized with preemption, unilateralism and primacy (Kirshner, 2003: 1-11).
3.3.4.1. Preemptive Strike:
The NSS, for the survival of the U.S., calls for preemptive military action
against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop WMD. Pre-emptive
action means striking first at an adversary that is about to attack (Gaddis, 2002).26
The NSS tries to specify a legal basis for preemption by alleging that international
law recognizes "nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action
to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack."
(NSS, 2002: 15).27 “The best defense is offence” or “the offense knows where it will
strike, but the defense does not” can be seen as the starting point of this main theme.
Administration officials have consistently stated that the concept of preemption
is focused on terrorists and rogue states. Though the President seems to have avoided
the term "axis of evil" since he used it in his January 2002 State of the Union
address, the NSS's characterization of rogue states appears to define the common
traits of countries in the chapter five of the strategy (Bunn, 2003). The NSS defines
                                                
26 Sometimes prevention and preemption are confused. Prevention action is undertaken even if
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack (Kirshner, 2003: 2). Some asserts
that the strategy implies prevention not preemption. On the other hand, Haine and Lindström asserts
that although there is a clear difference between preemption and prevention, the NSS avoids making
such distinctions (Haine and Lindström, 2004).
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terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
innocents" and focuses on disrupting and destroying "terrorist organizations of global
reach" as a priority. Main reason of this vision is the thought that traditional
deterrence methods now are unsuccessful to such kind of threats to defend U.S.
(Köni, 2003a: 82). Krauthammer argues that the doctrine of preemption is an
improvement on classical deterrence (Krauthammer, 2004). The document assumes
that containment and deterrence, the strategic pillars during the Cold War, are no
longer applicable in a world where the threat of retaliation “is less likely to work
against leaders of rogue states.” (Haine and Lindström, 2004).  Colin Powell asserts
that undeterrable enemies are the first reason to apply preemption (Powell, 2004).
September 11 showed that terrorism carries big risks for the U.S. since she is
the major target. Now, there is a non-state actor, which cannot be deterred by
traditional measures. Anything can be done anytime. According to the U.S., even the
slightest risks should not be taken since it may cause great casualties. President Bush
has said if they recognize a clear and present threat that is undeterrable by the means
they have at hand, then they must deal with it. They do not wait for it to strike; and
do not allow future attacks to happen before they take action (Kirshner, 2003: 1-11).
Powell asserts that second reason for including the notion of preemption in the NSS
is to convey to their adversaries that they are in big trouble (Powell, 2004).
According to their thought, instilling a certain amount of anxiety in terrorist groups
increases the likelihood that they will cease activity or make mistakes and be caught.
Namely, concept of deterrence turns into preemption action.
3.3.4.2. Unilateralism:
                                                                                                                                         
27 On the other hand, some, like Kegley and Raymond, assert that preemption represents a direct
rejection of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter that condones war only in self-defense (Kegley
and Raymond, 2003).
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The NSS expresses a commitment to multilateral international cooperation, but
makes clear that the U.S. “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary” to defend
national interests and security. Although unilateral action is mentioned two times in
the strategy, it should be remembered that main idea of the paragraphs, articles or
statements is either in the beginning or at the end. If someone tries to find the main
idea, he should look at beginning or ending.  First using of “unilateral action if
necessary” is in the beginning of the enemy definition and second using is at the end
of the strategy. Thus, unilateral action is one of the cornerstones of the strategy.
According to Robert Jervis, preventive wars is linked to the fundamental
unilateralism in the Bush doctrine since forming a consensus for such strong actions
in the international arena is very difficult (Jervis, 2003: 374). Many states mean
many problems for taking a decision. Many the U.S. administration members
perceive institutions as a ‘hobble’. Terrorism is one of the chief subjects, which can
be perceived differently from state to state. There is not even a common definition
for it. Bush stated, “Yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while
dangers gather.” in the state of Union Address on January 29, 2002. The
administration thinks that there is no time to loose for punishing terrorists by waiting
other states consensus. The president Bush declares in the strategy, “We cannot
defend America and our friends by hoping for the best” (NSS, 2002: ii).
If the strategy is examined carefully, in six chapters of nine, alliance and
coalitions or working together are mentioned. Moreover, ally, coalition and such
kind of topics are mentioned for twenty-five times.  Strategy admits that
multilateralism is important but sense of multilateralism in the document is different.
Multilateralism is accepted but under the leadership of the U.S. Besides, it should be
considered that people who contributed to preparation of the strategy generally think
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that institutions or multilateralism has been hindering to implement U.S.’s interests.28
The U.S. thinks that as well as the relatively limited capacities of international or
regional bodies such as the UN and EU, she possesses a unique role in coping with
the most urgent international problems, whether in regional conflicts, ethnic
cleansing, financial crises, or other kinds of issues (Lieber, 2002). For instance,
although NATO invoked Article V after the attacks, the U.S. acted alone in the
Afghanistan operation.
3.3.4.3. Primacy of Power:
In order to implement first two idea, preemptive and unilateralist action, power
is the necessary element. For the security of U.S., NSS sees the military strength as
obligatory since it defines primary mission of the military as defending the U.S. The
strongest military means the strong U.S. and it means more security.
The Bush NSS confidently acknowledges America’s unparalleled position of
power in the world29 and clearly holds the argument that a fundamental goal of U.S.
grand strategy should be to maintain her position (NSS, 2002: 30). Because, the NSS
document expresses a need to maintain that position to discourage other nations from
acquiring weapons to challenge U.S. power on the one side, American power is
essential to the building and maintenance of existing order on the other side.
In addition, the unparalleled hegemonic position enjoyed by the U.S. is now a
welcome reality that offers opportunities to shape the international arena. Thus, the
NSS announces that the U.S. has it and she will not allow her global military strength
to be challenged by any foreign power.  So according to strategy, big states realizing
                                                
28 For instance, Richard Perle is one of those people. He made a comment in Guardian on March 21,
2003 under the title of “Thank God for the death of the UN”.
29 This topic is highlighted seven times in the strategy.
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the power of the U.S. will choose to cooperate with the U.S., there will be no
competition in other states hence the world will be safer.
Besides, with relation to protecting even increasing American power NSS
clarifies that the U.S. will require bases and stations within and beyond Western
Europe and Northern Asia (NSS, 2002: 29). Power of the U.S. will be made stronger
by the help of these new bases. They will supply to let world know about the power
of the U.S. more dominantly.
3.3.4.4. Miscellaneous:
Of course, there are some other themes in the doctrine. Nevertheless, they are
not as important as first three. Spreading democracy can be listed as a sub-theme. It
has started to become even more important than first three issues with ‘Greater
Middle East Project’ (GME). NSS states that the U.S. will spread democracy and
freedom for human dignity. Strategy involves ‘democratic peace’ thesis: that open
democratic polities are less able or willing to use power in an arbitrary and
indiscriminate manner against other democracies (Russett and O’Neal, 2001: 6-25).
Thus, problem issues especially terrorism will be solved by the help of democracy.
NSS targets especially Muslim countries (NSS, 2002: 6 and 31). Regime changes for
this purpose are the main subject for the NSS.
Other sub-theme may be the security of energy resources for the U.S. (NSS,
2001: 19). NSS expresses that the U.S. will strengthen her own energy security in the
Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. So interests of
the U.S. could be secured. No country could use the energy as a ‘card’ against the
U.S. The NSS accepts that while doing this, the U.S. would need new bases.
Indeed, first three main elements emphasized in the NSS are like a path
showing how the miscellaneous issues will be managed or executed. Sub-theme
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issues can be perceived as targets on the one side, main parameters of the strategy
can be seen as methods to reach these targets on the other side. That is to say,
foremost elements of the strategy are methodology to pursue the aims. This
methodology is a clue of American policies’ direction within the frame of ‘war
against terrorism’.
3.4. Directions of the U.S Foreign Policy within the Frame of Realist New
Security Strategy:
Terrorism became the major element to direct American policies. The NSS,
based on ‘war against terrorism’ has shaped foreign and security policies of the U.S.
After explaining main parameters of security strategy, new directions of the U.S.’s
policies can be understood by looking at the theoretical roots of it. At first sight, new
strategy seems to be a mix of two main approach of international relations theory;
realism and liberalism.30 However, its realism aspects are dominant factors in the
strategy. Especially, people who prepared this strategy generally share realist
arguments.
According to realism, state is the most important or principal actor. It is state
centric. State is viewed as a unitary and rational actor. Realism depicts international
affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally
pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war (Arı, 2002: 121-136).
There is hierarchy between issues, those of military and security have a priority, and
they are called as ‘high politics’. According to Tim Dunne all realists subscribe to the
following ‘three Ss’: statism, survival, self-help (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001:150).
                                                
30 Michael Hirsh argues that the president Bush in the middle of ‘titanic fights’ between Secretary of
State Colin Powell and his lonely band of moderate multilateralists, the Donald Rumsfeld-Dick
Cheney axis of realist unilateralists, and a third group of influential neoconservatives led by
Wolfowitz (Hirsh, 2002).
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According to realism, the primary objective of all states is survival. This is the
most important national interest to which all politicians must adhere. In order to
preserve the security of their state, leaders must adopt an ethic, which judges actions
according to outcome rather than act is wrong or right (Morgenthau and Thompson,
1985: 10). If a state tries to provide her security, she must be aware of dangers,
anticipate them and take precautions. Political leaders should not wait for things to
happen or others to act. It can clearly be matched with the preemption theme of the
NSS.
Additionally, realism argues that no other state can be depended on to
guarantee your survival. State actors are responsible for ensuring their own survival
(Arı, 2002: 120-121). Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its
safety on another actor or international institutions such as UN. This argument of
realism can be perceived equal to the unilateralism theme of the NSS.
Statism is the centerpiece of realism. It involves two claims; one is that state is
the preeminent actor and others are less significant, the other is that state sovereignty
signifies the existence of an independent community. For the survival and security,
states seek power. Strong states can give a route to the international politics in
proportion to their power (Forde, 1995: 375-376). In addition, power consists of
effect and capacity (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 10). Power does not have any
meaning if it is not used. In order to be able to provide great effect of capacity, state
must change static power into dynamic power. Primacy issue of the NSS can be
matched with realism’s principle of statism.
Matching of Statism (Power)-Primacy, Survival (Deterrence)-Preemption and
Self_Help-Unilateralism can be can be done within this perspective. Namely, New
Security Strategy of the U.S. for the war against terrorism was prepared within the
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standpoint of realism. That is to say, peculiarities of realism would give clear hints
about U.S.’s activities. For that reason, other clarifying other issues of realism will be
useful to see route of the U.S.
According to realism, elements orienting the statesman are fear, suspect,
security dilemma, insecurity, prestige and interests. Especially fear and fear-rooted
insecurity are main reasons, which compel states to make a war (Dunne and Schmidt,
2001:150). It is the duty of a statesperson to make calculations rationally in a hostile
and threatening environment. Fear of terrorism settled into the minds of
administration members like all Americans after the September 11. It even became
‘phobia’. Since political leaders must firstly pursue national interests and protect
state from external threats, the U.S. would try to find a country or countries for
defeating fear or gaining self-confidence again. First conclusion about NSS of the
U.S. can be pointed as a war, hot war. Since the NSS of the U.S. carries realist
elements, war would be product of NSS.
Furthermore, for realists, survival of the state can never be guaranteed thus the
use of force is a legitimate instrument of statesman. Machiavelli argued that an ethic
of responsibility is the limits of ethics in international politics (Arı, 2002: 124).
Preserving the life of the state and community is the moral duty of statesperson. If a
war is considered necessary to protect national interest, it is moral. Thus, outcomes
of actions are important. If the result is positive for state, it is moral (Morgenthau and
Thompson, 1985: 12). That is to say, realism does not concentrate on right-wrong or
legal-illegal war. Second result can be concluded from this perspective of realism as;
war, which would be made by the U.S., would not have been legal or illegal. It would
not be a problem for the U.S.
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As well, realism perceives self-defense concept very broadly. If threat is clearly
perceived, there is no need to wait for other side’s action. That is, realism legitimizes
hegemony (Forde, 1995: 375-376). Moreover, Carr argues that, a war, which was
started due to the security anxieties self-defense primarily, can turn into an attack-
war (Carr, 1972: 23-40). He gave an example that, World War I begun for defense
but then it turned into a war for gaining a territory. Third result for the U.S. policy,
war against terrorism would turn a tool for hegemonic aspirations. Alternatively,
‘war against terrorism’ would target wrong cases; there would have been some
deviations.
These three outcomes for the U.S.’s policies after declaring NSS were not
surprising because NSS carries realist features and such results are the main products
of realistic policies.  Henceforward more specifically;
U.S. policy became more assertive and offensive. Preemptive and/or preventive
actions take place around the policy makers as well as the society. International
norms would not be criteria for the U.S. if they were not consistent with interests of
the U.S. The emphasis upon the readiness to use of force in the international arena
pronounced more and sooner or later, the U.S. government would have to present the
U.S. public with some concrete results of its struggle against terrorism. This became
an incentive for broadening military operations and orients them towards areas where
the changes of achieving an impressive victory are greater. The U.S. has counted on
herself and refrained from other international actors for fighting terrorism. At the
same time, other countries’ attitudes towards the U.S. struggle with terrorism will be
criteria for U.S. policy towards them. These tendencies and directions took the U.S.
to the Middle East region.
3.5. Heading towards Middle East to Implement the New Strategy:
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New NSS designated a mainframe of how the war on terrorism would be
performed. Middle East which can be named as the ‘rotten tooth’ was chosen for the
implementation of the NSS. Main reason of this choice is security anxiety.
According to Ronald Asmus, threat for the U.S. public comes from Middle East after
the Cold War (Asmus and Pollack, 2004). Because U.S. perceives that terrorist
attacks, targeting US, stem from this region. Dictators, despotism regimes, poverty,
radicalism are seen major causes of terrorism. According to Americans, terrorism can
find life-place due to the lack of authority in the region. In their opinion, democracy
will fill the absence of authority and it will plug to terrorism canals (Sanberk, 2003).
For that reason, U.S. government thinks that democratization of the region is a very
important step for the war against terrorism. So transformation decision of the
Middle East can be seen as the output of the NSS or implementation area of it.
Before the Iraq war, Pentagon alleged that by intervening in the Gulf region,
global security could be taken under the control (Barnett, 2003). Barnett alleges that
war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point—the moment when Washington
takes real ownership of strategic security against terrorism and rouge states. In
addition, R. Asmus asserts that democratic, economic and political transformation
must be done in the region and nowhere is that kind of change needed more than
GME (Asmus, 2003). Such kind of thoughts mean that war against terrorism in the
Middle East, by transforming it, has replaced the struggle with communism
especially in the Europe in the Cold War era. Beginning of this phase became Iraq
War.
Indeed, interests of the US in the region are not limited with security for
terrorism. Energy security especially petroleum, ensuring Israel’s survival,
forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon can be listed as other
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interests (Lesser, Nardulli and Arghavan, 172). In other words, U.S. will gain
multidimensional interest by dealing with this region within the perspective of war
against terrorism. Not one but more than one aim is not abnormal for the superpower.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that war against terrorism might be easily
deviated from original purposes (Özcan, 2003: 95-101). Beginning aims and
destination points may be very different. It exists in the soul of war against
terrorism.31 As well, NSS is based on realist arguments and according to realists as
Carr argues that, a war, which was started due to the security anxieties self-defense
concept at first, can turn attack-war (Carr, 1981: 23-40). Concerning to this idea, Iraq
War can be characterized as a deviation from war against terrorism. But by the
tactical and operational changes in the transformation period, this deviation can be
removed while the purpose of war against terrorism remains the same.
On the other hand, in Iraqi War period the U.S. comforted with the main
parameters of the own NSS. Firstly, WMD was showed as a reason for war. Iraq had
used such kind of weapons two times in the history; one was against Iran the other
was against her own Kurdish people. Many people (were) believed that there were
WMD in Iraq. According to U.S. government there was not any guarantee that those
WMD would not be used against to the U.S. by Saddam or any terrorist groups.
Moreover, Iraq had resisted for a long time to give permission to UN commission to
inspect WMD in Iraq. It increased suspicions. At the end, WMD became the main
reason for war. This opinion reminds us to preemption even prevention parameter of
the NSS.32
                                                
31 The similar instance was seen in Turkey with Susurluk case. While struggling with terrorism
different methods, the state lost the control of her tools and many illegal events was appeared for that
reason.
32 On the other hand, after the Iraqi war, WMD claims were disproved.
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Secondly, although there were strong oppositions in the international arena,
U.S. did not give up the idea of war with Iraq. Many EU states, including Germany
and permanent member of the UN Security Council France, in addition to permanent
member of the UN Security Council, Arab States opposed the U.S. who was trying to
convince them. After US understood that they were not convinced to be with US, she
decided to act with her own decision by the help of some supporter states. So
unilateral act when it is necessary pointed in the NSS was implemented.
Thirdly, while doing this unilaterally, the U.S. proved her army power. War
was won within 20 days although Turkey did not allow U.S. to open north front.
Many thought that, especially in Turkey, the U.S. could not be successful without
opening a north front. Even some alleged that Iraqi army would strongly resist the
American soldiers. Nevertheless, it did not become so. American primacy and
military technology was demonstrated all over again.
Spreading democracy pointed in the NSS was also objected by explaining aim
of the war as ‘democratization of Iraq’. Also undertaking the Middle East would
provide energy security, which was indicated in the chapter six of NSS.
In spite of strong oppositions in the world, war decision of U.S. showed that
she was very serious about shaping the Middle East. Persuasive deterrence of her has
increased. Although she stumbles in Iraq,33 Iran and Libya accepted to be inspected
for nuclear and biologic activities. Syria is also in some actions, which aim to prove
that she does not support terrorist activities, such as trying to establish close relations
with Turkey and to solve problems with Israel. Namely, these countries have
understood the seriousness of the U.S. about the region. From now on, even if the
U.S. apply soft power in place of hard power for transforming the region, region
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countries undoubtedly bear in their mind that the U.S. can apply hard power when
she sees it necessary.
GME initiative, which is mentioned after the Iraq war, is the indication that
transformation of the region will be continued with some tactical changes. This
project, although it has not completely explained,34 aims to compensate for Iraq War
wrongs, difficulties. Moreover, U.S. tries to insert NATO and EU in changing period
for gaining international support and sharing burdens. Nevertheless, all events will be
under the control of her authority.
This project includes series of political, economic and military programmes
(Perthes, 2004:1). These will include multilateral and bilateral measures to
democratize Middle Eastern countries, offers of free trade made to individual
countries, the geographical extension and deepening of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-Mediterranean partnership and programme of
military cooperation akin to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (Wright, 2004). It calls
for the U.S. and Europe to press for and assist free elections, foster new independent
media, help create a "literate generation," establish a greater Middle East
Development Bank modeled on Europe's postwar model, translate Western classics
into Arabic, and give $500 million in loans to small entrepreneurs, especially
women, according to the draft report (Çongar, 2004). This initiative contains 22
countries and Turkey, Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It surrounds North Africa,
Arab peninsula, Caucasus and Afghanistan shortly Muslim countries. Glenn Kessler
                                                                                                                                         
33 Indeed stumbling of the US in Iraq is not surprising. Until this time, the U.S. made 200 foreign
interventions. She has aimed to state building in 16 of them but she has only accomplished four cases;
Germany, Japan, Panama and Grenada.
34 This project was discussed in G-8 summit in June 2004 and it will also be discussed in NATO
Summit in June 2004. An eight-page draft of the plan was first published on the Web site of the
London newspaper Al Hayat on February 26, 2004.
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and Robin Wright evaluate GME initiative as Helsinki accord of the Middle East35
(Kessler and Wright, 2004). The help of this project will pull terrorism to tolerable
level, security of petroleum will be supplied and democracy will be established in the
region countries (Özcan, 2004).
GME project proves that Iraq was first step of the transformation. Name of the
transformation project will be GME or different. Since failure is not an option for
both the U.S. and all other states, changing period will be continued. In view of the
fact that communism threat was replaced by terrorism, new struggle field is anymore
Middle East. In addition, this struggle will be very long like fifty-year Cold War
period. It can be alleged that GME project may not be succeeded as it is proposed.
However, transformation of the Middle East is seemed inevitable because the U.S.
produces terrorism-oriented policies. This transformation period will affect all
countries especially region countries including Turkey.
As a result, after the cold war there were great debates about defining new
enemy in the U.S. People, who thought that terrorism was a number one threat for
the U.S., got the ‘victory’ ‘by the help of September 11’. Public now are convinced.
Great majority, thinking that war against terrorism had to be done, in the public were
formed. On the other side another group in the administration and public, who
thought that U.S. should have perceived more assertive policy in the international
arena to strengthen her power, gained to atmosphere to realize their ideas and plans.
The consolidation of two groups formed nearly all of the U.S. due to the September
11 and gave the reason for new security strategy whose main themes were depended
on the realistic thoughts. By preparing and implementing new strategy, former
became happy for seeing war against to terrorism later was also happy for seeing
                                                
35 In 1975, 35 countries was signed an agreement in Helsinki in order to oppress Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe States for more freedom. There were some ‘magic’ concepts in accord such as
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assertive policy to show American power while fighting against to terrorism. It
should not be forgotten that new terrorism formed such kind of situation by
executing September 11. Some type of war seemed inevitable. Battlefield was
determined as Middle East where was seen as roots of terrorism.
This new strategy and war against terrorism will affect Turkey’s security
because three of seven ‘rouge states’ and two of three ‘axis of evil’ states are
neighbors of Turkey. Moreover, battlefield chosen by the U.S. is next to Turkey. All
eyes turned to the Middle East and especially on Iraq. First step of the NSS was
carried out in Iraq neighbor of Turkey. Moreover, US want to give some role for
Turkey. GME project includes Turkey. Both her geographic position and her
alignment with the US make inevitable that Turkey will be included this war and
transformation period like in the Cold War. War and transformation is next to
Turkey. This means that there will be important outcomes for Turkey’s security. Yet
in order to better analyze the inevitable changes for Turkish security, it is necessary
to see how the traditional Turkish security concerns were outlined before the
September 11 world affairs.
                                                                                                                                         
freedom, human rights, democracy, free trade, support to opposition parties.
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CHAPTER IV:
SECURITY POLICY AND THREAT PERCEPTION OF TURKEY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Turkey whose main security policy is to protect territorial integrity already
concentrated on the Middle East long before the U.S. due to the some security
anxieties coming from this region. Terrorism was the main reason of this. Even, it
can be said that due to the Middle East, Turkey’s foreign policy was established on
security issues or more correctly, it was “securitized”. In the previous chapters, new
terrorism and new American NSS were analyzed. To point out whether
implementation of the American NSS in the Middle East increased or decreased
Turkey’s security anxieties and what kind of changes occurred in Turkey’s threat and
security assessments, firstly traditional security issues and threat perceptions for
Turkey should be clarified. In this chapter, Turkey’s post-Cold War era security
policy and threat assessment in the period between 1991 and 2002 will be clarified in
order to point out what the security means for Turkey and what kind of events are
evaluated as a threat.
During the Cold War, Turkey paid attention on Soviet Union and Greece in
terms of security issues. However, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been
focused more heavily than ever before on events to the South not as an alternative
foreign policy direction but as a response to security challenges related with both
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external and internal dimensions (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 127). These challenges
emerged with the end of the Cold War and new and more dangerous threats appeared
for Turkey from the South. Double-team of Greece and Soviet was replaced with the
team of Greece and the Middle East. Thus, Turkey has revised her security policies
and threat perceptions in the new context. Main idea about security, to protect
territorial integrity is the same but focused direction is different.
At first events occurring after the Cold War, which affected Turkish foreign
and security policy, will be clarified. Disintegration of the Soviet Union and Gulf
War in 1991 made considerable changes on Turkey’s security and threat
assessments. After putting these developments, leading threats Turkey concentrated
on, especially in the new era, will be put one by one. Because of the changing
conditions and emerging new threats, Turkey revised her national security policy and
threat assessment. The National Security Policy and Military Strategy shaped by
these threats and events will be explained. Considering of her security policy, Turkey
perceived the threat from the South more heavily than the other regions. Lastly,
measures Turkey has taken will be pointed for proving that threat perception and
security calculation of Turkey changed and directed to the South from the North.
4.1. Post-Cold War Developments Causing to Change Turkey’s Security
Assessments:
In Turkey, although threat perceptions and directions have been changed, main
parameter of the security policy is the same; to protect territorial integrity (White
Papers, 2003). It is seen as the core of security policy of Turkey. Considering the
main parameter, methods and strategies have been modified parallel with changing
events in the world. According to Ergüvenç, there were some important events,
which caused to change in Turkey’s security evaluation, in the period between 1991
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and 2002 (Ergüvenç, 1998: 34-42). First one is the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and second is the Gulf War in 1991. Just as other states modified their security
perceptions again so Turkey evaluated her position, assessments and made radical
changes in her policies for her core aim in the light of these developments. They
radically altered Turkey’s foreign and security policy by creating opportunities to
expand its role while also posing new risks and challenges (Sayari, 2000: 169-183).
Weakening of ‘Russian threat’ was the most important result of disintegration
of the Soviet Union in terms of Turkey. Turkey’s traditional security policy was
based on Greece and especially Soviet threats. Owing to the Soviet demands from
Turkey and communism jeopardy, Turkey had wanted to be a member of NATO and
she became. This threat together with problems existing with Greece gave a
framework to Turkey for foreign and security policy (Lesser, 2002: 275-299).
Indeed ‘Moscow threat’ phobia reached over to the last centuries of the
Ottoman Empire. Turks’ policy with including the Ottoman period had been
defensive since the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000: 196-216) and
this continued to beginning of 1990s. After the disintegration, the pressure of Soviet
Union on Turkey was removed although it did not disappear completely. Russia was
not as strong as before, she had her own problems especially about economic issues
and domestic problems. As well, Turkey does not have land border with Russia. In
order to gain her previous activity and to be able to maintain her dominance in the
world, Russia has tried to make good relations with other states especially about
energy issue. She applied military methods only within the Russia and ex-Soviet
states. There is no doubt that Russia is still very strong and important country not
only in the region but also in the world, however she is not perceived as a direct
threat to Turkey’s integrity.
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Moreover, regarding to threat assessment, as Hunter pointed, Turkey has
benefited from the systemic changes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union:
the collapse of the Soviet Union has weakened Turkey’s enemies and rivals such as
Syria, Iraq and Iran, thereby relieving Turkish foreign and security policy of certain
constraints and increasing its options (Hunter, 1999). So this can be seen as a
positive impact. Thus, this situation gave an opportunity to Turkey to play more
dynamic role in the region and to change her policy from defensive to active. Even
Turkey’s role was started to be defined as ‘pivotal state’36 by many strategists
(Makovsky, 1999: 49) due to having border with the Middle East, which is the most
problematic area of the world.
On the other hand, there were some negative impacts of disintegration of the
Soviet Union in terms of Turley’s security. After the dissolution of Soviet Union risk
free region such as Balkans and Middle East increased, while as Turkey had found
itself facing with new risks and challenges. Turkey places at the centre of the
Balkans; Middle East and the Caspian Region. According to the NATO’s Military
Committee (MC) 161 Document, there are 16 regions, which are determined by the
Alliance as “instable and risky”, and 13 of them are just said to be around Turkey
(Ateşoğlu, 2003). Unstable condition emerging in the Balkans and in the Middle East
became ‘headaches’ for Turkey. There are 13 countries around Turkey in the new
context with 11 different ethnic nationalities in addition to speaking 10 different
languages and practicing 6 different religions (Ergüvenç, 1998: 43-42) and all of
them have their own different historical experiences and aspirations. This diversity
created big conflicts in some regions such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia in the
Balkans or Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus. Middle East is
                                                
36 Definition and information about the pivotal states can be found in Chase, Robert, Emily Hill, and
Paul Kennedy. January/February 1996. “The Pivotal States,” Foreign Affairs.
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problem all on its own with Israel-Palestine problem, terrorism issue and, energy,
petroleum struggle of states. Turkey placed at the heart of fire.
As she places in the middle of these unsteady regions, Turkey has been anxious
about her security especially about the Middle East. There have been unsteady in the
Balkans but there have not been direct threat to Turkey’s integrity. In order to be
dominant regional power and due to having close historical and cultural ties with
Balkan people, Turkey of course has concerned with those problems. Nevertheless,
those problems have never posed unease to Turkey in terms of home security. On the
other hand, situation of the Middle East is different. In the Middle East, the conflict
has never been lack. Iran-Iraq war, Arab-Israeli conflicts, supports of Syria, Iran, and
Iraq to terrorism against to Turkey, energy issues have made the region more
complex. Finding a solution to these problems has been difficult. Especially desire of
region countries to be a hegemonic power has prevented to find a solution (Yılmaz,
2002: 115-140). Turkey’s security has been directly affected by unsteadiness in the
region. Especially terrorism issue became major problem for Turkey in the new era.
Beginning of the Gulf War in 1991, owing to the occupation of Iraq to Kuwait
is second important event, which caused significant changes on Turkey’s security
directions. Traditional policy of Turkey towards the Middle East, non-involvement,
was given up (Ersoy, 2001: 323-335). During the Cold War period, Turkey, avoided
any participation in inter-Arab disputes, Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional
conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War in which she maintained scrupulous neutrality.
Passive policy was abandoned by giving permission to the coalition forces to use
Turkish territory for their operations to bomb Iraq and by closing oil pipelines, which
caused then very important economic loses. Besides and more importantly, lack of
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authority in the north part of Iraq emerged that created very important results for
Turkey. The PKK exploited the collapse of Saddam’s power in northern Iraq.
Operation Provide Comfort conducted soon after the Cold War aroused suspicious of
Turkey since it gave opportunity to Kurds to be freer in the region. Thus, heaviness
of southeast in terms of security was felt more dominantly.
4.2. Main Threats to Turkey’s Security after the Cold War:
In the light of these events, Turkey has determined her threat assessment in
order to adapt herself to new order. While determining her security policy, national
interest is the most important factor. Historical ties and geographic position have
always become diagnostic points for Turkey to shape security perceptions (Ergüvenç,
1998: 34-42). Turkey’s security policy and threat perception was shaped by
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. Relations with countries
and events experienced by Turkey became a guide in the phase of shaping the new
security policy of Turkey. So as to understand why Turkey’s security relations and
policies have been concentrated on south, threats, emerged and condensed after the
Cold War, have to be clarified. These threats can be listed as terrorism, probability of
a ‘Kurdish state’, WMD, fundamentalism and Iraq, Iran and Syria’s desires and
activities against Turkey.
4.2.1. Terrorism
After the Cold War, the most important threat became the PKK/KADEK
separatist terrorism37 in terms of Turkey’s security. Especially after 1990, terrorist
activities became the most important agenda of Turkey’s security. Nearly 30,000
people have died and 85 billion dollars have been spent for struggling with terrorism
(Kirişçi, 2002a: 151-180). Particularly lack of authority in the north part of the Iraq
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after the Gulf War supplied terrorist to move freely in the region. Between 1993 and
1995 terrorist activities reached to the top. Apart from the economic loses, which
could have been spent for development of the country, due to dying of many people
and danger to ambition of separatism, Turkey took strict measures both in and out of
the country. The NSC affirmed in the national security document of 1992 that the
threat of the terrorism with a motion of separatism was the foremost threat against
Turkey’s security (Turkpulse, 2001).
Because of fighting against the terrorism in the post-Cold War era, Turkish
foreign policy and mutual relations with other states depended on terrorism issue in a
great degree. İdris Bal argues that many opportunities were missed in the
international arena due to dealing with terrorism (Bal and Aytuç, 2001: 685-699).
Especially relations with Middle East states; Iran, Iraq and Syria, became strained
due to their support to terrorism and for many times Turkey warned them for not to
give any support to terrorism. Especially, Syria helped terrorists by giving logistics
support and head of the terrorists had stayed in Syria until Turkey explicitly
threatened in 1998. Bekaa Valley in Syria was a training center of PKK. As for Iraq,
As Ümit Özdağ points that Saddam located PKK terrorists in villages where are the
near of Turkish border (Özdağ, 1996). Northern Iraq was used as a base by the PKK.
Even Tarık Aziz, who was the foreign minister of Saddam regime, was showed a file,
which proved supports of Iraqi government to PKK when he visited to Turkey in
1999 (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140).
PKK issue was also matter with Iran since Turkey alleged that some PKK
terrorists were settled in the border of Iran. Turkey declared that she had some
proofs, which showed Iran support to PKK (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Even it was
                                                                                                                                         
37 Detailed information about the PKK terrorism can be found in Nihat Ali Özcan. 1999. PKK-
Kürdistan İşçi Partisi: Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yönetimi (PKK-Kurdistan Worker Party: Its History,
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even rumored that a frustrated Turkish government considered a military attack on
PKK bases in Iran in May 1995 (Tempo, 1996). In 1996, due to the terrorist attacks
to villages near the Iran border, the president of Turkey warned Iran very strictly.
The refusal of Iran to Turkey’s accusations did not decrease the level of tension
between both states. Turkey applied different methods such as diplomatic and
military measures to protect her territorial integrity against terrorism. For instance, in
order to deter these countries, military cooperation agreement was signed with Israel
in 1996 (Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Moreover, owing to the importance of the threat,
Turkey did not give any concession about performing her measures against the
terrorism although West has made many criticisms about humanitarian rights and
using their weapons in the region. Shortly terrorism has still been one of the main
threats for Turkey’s integrity and it has still a place at the top of the threat list.38
4.2.2. ‘Kurdish State’ Threat
Possibility of Kurdish state due to the situation in the Iraq emerged after the
Gulf War was another important threat. Due to the lack of official authority in the
north part of Iraq, some Kurdish groups started to attempt for establishing a Kurd
state. In December 1991 eight Kurdish groups were gathered and took a decision for
establish a council. They made an election in 1992 and founded a Council of
Minister, which was an important step in terms of their aims of establishing a Kurd
state (Arı, 2001: 441-460). According to their desires; in addition to northern Iraq,
which is called ‘southern Kurdistan’ by them, many cities of Turkey such as Hakkari,
Diyarbakır even Iskenderun belong to their state. Leaders of Kurd groups have
explained several times that they have been waiting for appropriate time to establish
a state (Hürriyet, September 8, 2002). Even their names of parties contain
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‘Kurdistan’, which shows their intentions clearly. For that reason, Turkey always
declares that integrity of Iraq should be preserved. Turkey sometimes even tried to
repair the relations with Iraq with for that reason despite American opposition.
Common points of terrorism and ‘Kurdish state’ threats are; they directly targeted
territorial integrity of Turkey, they both became stronger after the Gulf War, and
lastly they interacted with each other very closely.
4.2.3. Weapons of Mass Destruction
Third threat was WMD and ballistic missiles. Apart from Turkey, all states of
the region have ballistic missiles (Kirişçi, 2002a: 151-180). Fueled by a combination
of external and internal motives or both, Iran, Iraq and Syria have been acquiring
WMD capabilities, along with the means for delivering them. Iran already has a
substantial chemical warfare capability. She has been pursuing nuclear and biological
weapons (Al, 2001: 3). It also has an advanced long-range ballistic missile
development program. WMD has taken great importance particularly after an
agreement between Russia and Iran, which was about develop nuclear weapons.
Studies of Iran have been continuing and Şahab-3 missile was produced and tested
successfully in July 2000 (Sabah, July 18, 2000). Iraq’s WMD development
programs were on hold while UN sanctions prevail, but it was widely believed that
during the Saddam regime, Iraq retained chemical and biological weapons
production capability and Baghdad was in a position to produce chemical and
biological weapons quickly once international sanctions were lifted. Syria has
chemical weapons and a biotechnical infrastructure to support a limited biological
warfare program. Damascus increasingly has relied on a strategic deterrent based on
ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities (Al, 2001: 2-4). Nowhere else in
                                                                                                                                         
38 In an interview of M.Ali Kışlalı, Hilmi Özkök clarified that terrorism is still major problem issue
for Turkey. Radikal November 9, 2003.
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NATO have been the disturbing effects of WMD proliferation felt more keenly than
in Turkey.
Turkey has been completely exposed to WMD threats and to air and missile
attacks on its southeastern borders. More than two thirds of Turkey’s territory,
including the capital city Ankara, and Turkey’s other population centers, dams,
power stations, air bases, communication facilities and military headquarters are
within the range of Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian ballistic missiles. Because these missiles
are capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads, Turkey has felt very
insecure.  (Larrabee, 2003: 142). And there is no guarantee that these states will not
use such kind of weapons against Turkey (Kibaroğlu, 2002: 61-65). In a crisis with
Syria in 1998, Turkey strongly perceived missile threat from Syria. Moreover, in
both war being made by UN and U.S. against Iraq in 1991 and in 2003 Turkey
demanded from NATO anti ballistic missile protection against to Iraq. A debate
about responsibility area of NATO was done due to application of Turkey because
Turkey was not sure that NATO would help Turkey to defend against missiles from
the Middle East. Since Turkey lacks surface-to-surface missiles, she has based its
strategy on detecting and retaliating against missile launching sites in neighboring
countries (Kirişçi, 1997). Thus, opinion of making such kind of weapons has been
put forward several times (Pak, 2002: 102-117) but due to signing some disarmament
agreements and cost of such project is very expensive, Turkey only has tried to
improve defence system for protection against WMD (Turgut, 2003: 141-151).
4.2.4. Fundamentalism:
Lastly, with related to internal security problems, fundamentalism has been
seen as a threat especially after the second period of the 1990s. Indeed, religious
issue has always become sensitive issue for Turkey. Since it directly targets to
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democratic character of Turkish Republic and aims to regime change,
fundamentalism with its external supports has been perceived as one of the most
dangerous threats to Turkey by laic part of the society especially by military. In
1997, General Staff gave a briefing to academicians, journalists, and some Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) and declared that there was a change in national
military strategic concept. New concept defined two internal threat, divisiveness and
fundamentalism supported in a great degree by Iran and Syria and put those threats to
the top of the list (Altunışık, 2002: 79-99). Especially, Turkey accused several times
Iran for her attempts to export Islamic regime into Turkey. There was some concern
among Turkish officials about an Iranian hand in Turkish politics, including
philosophical and monetary support for Islamists. Connections of Iran with
Hizbullah, Turkey carefully pursued Iran activities not only in Turkey both also in
the region. The ambassador of Iran was declared persona non grata after his speech,
which called for Turkey to prefer the Shari’a in a celebration of ‘Jerusalem Day’,
prepared by Sincan municipality.  Since the suspect of regime export of Iran and
internal political developments NSC made a change in the national security policy
document in 1997 by declaring that fundamentalism or political Islam was as
dangerous as terrorism for Turkish Republic (Ülman, 1999: 125). Even this threat
caused government changed in 1997 and Erbakan government resigned.39
In addition to these threats, Turkey has faced with some individual troubles
with region countries creating problems for her. With three countries, Turkey has a
land border there have been important problems causing to form dangerous.
4.2.5. Other Security Problems with Syria, Iraq and Iran:
                                                
39 This change is named as an ‘unarmed coup’ by the Center for Strategic & International Studies.
http://www.csis.org/turkey/TU9706.htm (16.05.2004).
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Syria has been the most problematic country for Turkey especially after 1990s
(Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Apart from the ballistic missiles and terrorism two issues
created problem between Turkey and Syria. First was water matter. Syria has
demanded more water from Turkey and she always becomes uneasy about all
Turkey’s water projects. Even, support of Syria to PKK terrorism started with the
beginning of Southeastern Anatolia Project in order to hinder to such kind of
projects. Particularly in 1995, Syria attempted to internationalize the water issue in
the platforms of Western and Arab counties (Hürriyet, September 17, 2003). But
Turkey has stated several times that water given to Syria is both enough and
compatible to international laws.
Second issue with Syria was Hatay. Syria has alleged that Hatay should be in
the borders of Syria. Demanding any part of Turkey’s territory always makes Turkey
uneasy. Apart from all, Syria conducted very close relations with Greece, which
could be evaluated as against to Turkey. It is known that both states made an
agreement, which included cooperation in military activities, and according to this
treaty if Greece had made a war with Turkey, Greece warplane would have used
Syrian air bases (Turkish Daily News, August 10, 1996). Even, as a result of this
agreement some Greece warplane got off Syrian air bases while they were
conducting military practice in the Mediterranean. Both states pursued the policy that
‘enemy of my enemy is my friend’. Former ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ proposed to
produce a 2½ strategy, which was against to Greece, Syria and PKK (Elekdağ,
1996). Elekdag's scenario came close to reality in mid-1996 (Kirişçi, 1997). Turkey
and Syria amassed troops along the border after Syrian claims that Turkey was
behind a series of bomb attacks in Syrian cities. This coincided with tense Turkish-
Greek relations over the islands of Kardak/Imea, which nearly brought war in
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January/February. In April, tension resurfaced after a Greek patrol boat fired on a
Turkish fishing boat and the Greek government withdrew from a foreign ministers'
meeting scheduled for June to seek ways to diffuse tensions. These events happened
together with a big military operation in May against the PKK, including an
incursion into northern Iraq. According to Makovsky, the Syrian threat was the
reason and the common point of Turkey-Israel military cooperation agreement
(Makovsky, 1996: 147-171).
As for Iraq, its situation has always been problem for Turkey. For that reason,
relations with Iraq can be best identified as an uncertain (Kirişçi, 2002b: 54-78).
Since two major threats PKK and sovereign Kurd state have been seen in this region
Turkey is always careful about Iraq especially about her territorial integrity.  Water
issue has also been problem with Iraq tough not as big as Syria. Turkey was
explicitly threatened by the Saddam regime two times. In 1991, because of the
Turkey’s permission to bomb Iraq from her air bases to use her airspace, Iraq warned
Turkey to retaliate. Additionally in 1999, Iraq another time threatened to Turkey
because of Turkey’s support to U.S. policies in the region. Gaining ballistic missiles
made probable to attack of Iraq to Turkey, by looking past war examples such as
Iran, Kuwait.
There were also several problems with Iran apart from terrorism and regime
export problems. In fact, there has been a struggle for being dominant power both in
the Middle East and in the Caucasus and being a model for ex-Soviet countries.  In
addition, competition not only in Central Asia but also in the Caucasus also caused
problems between Iran and Turkey.
4.3. Official National Security Policy and Military Strategy of Turkey:
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In the directions of new situations and threats emerging after the Cold War,
Turkey revised her security policy and threat perception. This new policy’s root was
established after the Cold War and as times passes it has been shifted according to
new situations. According to Turkish law40 national security is expressed as “the
preservation and protection against all kind of internal and external threats to the
constitutional order of state, her national existence, her integrity and her all political,
social, cultural, and economic interests and contractual rights in the international
arena”. The national security policy is defined in the same law as “It is a policy
including the principles related to internal, external and defense type operations
determined by the Council of Ministers within the views determined by the NSC
with the objective of providing national security and attaining the national goals”. It
is the same law that underlines Atatürk’s principle of ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the
World’. Moreover, according to Article 5 of the constitution, the basic aim and
responsibility of state is expressed as to protect independence and integrity of
Turkish Nation. National Security Policy can be pointed as to protect territorial
integrity and national independence, to defence vital national interest against to
threats and risks, to provide peace and stability in the region, to contribute global
peace and stability (Harp Akademileri, 2001).
In the light of these policies Turkey has aimed; to contribute to peace and
security in the region and to spread to large areas, to become a country producing
strategy and security that could influence all the strategies aimed as her region and
beyond, to become an element of power in her region and to make use of every
opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation (White Papers, 2003).41 These aims
                                                
40 Law No. 2945.
41 The White Paper is annual open source of the Ministry of National Defence which shows national
security policy of Turkey. The second document of Turkey about national security is National
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show, national security policy of Turkey relies on efforts for lessening tension; avoid
any conflict in her neighbors and creating a secure environment for peace and
stability (Harp Akademileri, 1996).
States always determine policy and strategy and with the purpose of putting
those in a practice. They use some methods. In order to accomplish them, policies
must be depended on some military strategies. As to Turkey, military strategies of
Turkey’s security policy are stated as: deterrence, forward defense, military
contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises, collective security
(White Papers, 2003).
Owing to existence of many threats toward her in the region, Turkey has
applied different methods, which has been changed according to situation, to
overcome them. Indeed these methods Turkey used clearly indicate where Turkey
concerns more heavily. Deterrence and forward defense are the most important
among four of them because these are directly related with to protect territorial
integrity and likelihood of use of force. Meaning of the deterrence can be expressed
as maintaining a military force aiming to pose an influence. Due to being at the
center of instable area and surrounded by uncertainties deterrence is the cornerstone
of the Turkey’s security. Turkey with her military power, necessity of deterrence, has
always applied to this policy against any states, which directly attack her vital
national interest. In Aegean Sea about territorial waters and continental shelf, Turkey
declared that 12 miles is a reason of war against Greece. In addition, this was used
again in the problem of S300 missiles with Greece. Those missiles were settled to
Crete although they had been intended to deploy to South Cyprus at first.
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Another experience was lived with Syria for two times in 1996 and in 1998.
Particularly in 1998, Turkey openly threatened to Syria due to her support of PKK
activities and sheltering the head of terrorists and wanted Syria to give up her
supports and to surrender the head of terrorists. In October 1998, Commander of
Land Forces Atilla Ateş stated that there had been an undeclared war with Syria due
to her support to PKK (Kirişçi, 2002a: 155) and clearly threatened to Syria. Soon
after this declaration, Turkey deployed many troops to Syria border. Finally, Syria
had to send the head of terrorists out of the country and signed Adana declaration
with Turkey about giving up supports to terrorists. Besides Turkey signed an
agreement with Israel in 1996 which contained military cooperation in the region
(Yılmaz, 2002: 115-140). Although it was declared that the agreement was not
against to third country, it is commonly believed that this agreement was signed for
deterring region countries. Syria, Iran and Iraq were uneasy owing to the agreement
since they perceived this treaty as a big threat for their countries. And they were left
no choice but rethinking their policies towards Turkey.
Secondly, that detection of the scope of a possible aggression as early as
possible and halting an actual aggression from out of borders is understood from the
phrase of forward defense. Turkey has also been using method of forward defense in
north part of Iraq for preventing terrorist activities. Due to lack of authority in the
region Turkey located some military troops in northern Iraq via agreements about hot
pursuit having signed with Iraq in order to provide security of her borders and to be
able to control of the region.42 For two times in 1992 and 1995, Turkey made big
operations in the Iraq borders to prevent and stroke to terrorist activities. Some
Turkish military troops have been permanently located beyond Iraq border to be able
                                                
42 The first hot pursuit agreement was signed in 1984 and it was renewed in 1997 (Turkish Daily
News, Jan 14, 1997)
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to control area. Additionally, sense of forward defense can be seen in other issues
such as Cyprus and Aegean. Hilmi Özkök pointed strategic importance of Cyprus in
the perspective of forward defense, as “any positioned hostile power on the island
can be reached all Turkey territory, which can not be reached even by plane now….
We have already some troubles in the West; if there is another trouble in the south it
means the imprisonment of Turkey” (Radikal, November 9, 2003). Turkey’s
insistence about these issues clearly shows that she does not want to be surrounded.
Turkey is quite successful about performing security strategies whose main
lines are drawn with National Military Strategy especially executing collective
security and military contribution to crisis management. Active participation in
international and regional alliances is the third element of her strategy. Especially in
the north, in the Black Sea and in the Balkans she has carried out very good jobs.
Although number of her neighbors was increased by disentangled of Soviet Union,
tension has never increased very seriously for Turkey’s integrity. For example, she
started to initiative of Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 1992 and Black Sea Naval
Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) was created by littoral states of Black
Sea. Also she initiated a process called South-East European Coordination Process
(SEECP), which brings Turkey together with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Romania, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and as an
observer Croatia. Another initiative of Turkey in the Balkans is the Multinational
Peace Force South East Europe (MPFSEE) originated from a Turkish proposal in
1997. 43
Beside her regional cooperation efforts for promotion of peace and stability,
Turkey has actively participated in international peace operations from the beginning
                                                
43 More information about these operations can be found in “Turkey's Security Perspectives and Its
Relations with NATO”. Available online at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm (10.05.2003)
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of 1990s. In Somalia, a Turkish force served in UNOSOM. In the Balkans since 1995
Turkey has taken part an active role in all operations led by NATO; Implementation
Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR). Turkish troops
have been in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. Lastly Turkey
assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. Turkey also provides personnel to the Observer Mission in Georgia as
well as to the operation in East Timor.
The aim of showing to military strategies of security policy Turkey used is to
point out which method Turkey has applied in different region and to indicate real
politic policies of Turkey in the Middle East because of chancing her threat
assessments. Although the Balkan states are one of the most instable regions of the
world in the post-Cold War era, Turkey did not show great anxiety in terms of her
territorial integrity. On the other hand, in the Middle East, situation is completely
different because structure of states and understanding of public is completely
different. Chaotic situation has continued more and more in the region and Turkey
could not have done something in support of cooperative initiatives. Two different
approaches are perceived in two different regions. Security policy of Turkey can be
defined as; collective security in the north and real politic in the south. Considering
to idea that the most dangerous threat is the nearest, south became very critic. For
that reason in the new threat assessment of Turkey, south is given a special
importance for territorial integrity.
4.4. Measures Taken by Turkey against threats:
There have been many measures both politically and economically about region
but seeing military actions makes easier to perceive that Turkey has concentrated on
the south. In 1992, terrorism was put at the top of the threats in national security
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policy document with passing Greece. Despite some amendments in 1997, 1999 and
2001 in this document, terrorism and fundamentalism were at the top of security
risks again (Yücel, 2002: 10). Priorities of them have sometimes changed
successively. Military cooperation agreement with Israel can be perceived another
military measure to defeat risks and threats. Military Training and Education
Agreement was signed between Turkey and Israel in February 1996. The main
objective of the accord was to facilitate cooperation between the two countries in
military education through a series of measures, including joint air force training,
naval visits, military personnel exchanges and joint training in military academics. A
separate agreement signed in December 1996 called for Israel’s aid in upgrading
Turkey’s fleet of F-4Phantom jets at an estimated cost of $650 million. It is clear that
Turkey expected to accomplish several strategic objectives such as winning to fight
against terrorism, deterring region countries for not giving any support to terrorism,
because of its increased military cooperation with Israel. Moreover, Turkey tried to
find alternative sources for weapon systems and military equipment (Altunışık, 2002:
79-99). The Israel-Turkish agreement of February 1996 was perceived as a realistic
move and it was widely perceived that Israeli-Turkish security cooperation would
help Turkey in its fight against the PKK (Naaz, 1999). Moreover, Turkey would
want to see and use NATO’s guarantee in the south region if any country from there
attacked, and made a great effort to prevent any change in structure of Article 5 the
Washington Treaty of April 1949 establishing NATO, committed member countries
to defend any member facing aggression. If it is necessary for putting more specific
examples;
Another measure taken by Turkey against new threats was that, many troops
were deployed to south eastern and eastern of Turkey and number of soldiers, with
83
gendarmerie, reached nearly 200,000. These troops are normally assigned in other
parts of Turkey but due to the terrorism in those years they were assigned in the
southeast region. For instance, some troops, which are normally assigned in the
Thrace, were used in the south until 2000 and they were taken back to their real area
of responsibility gradually not immediately. As well, ‘extraordinary situation’ was
declared in the southeastern of Turkey and it was conducted until beginning of
2000s. Besides, demands of shortening the period of compulsory military service was
refused in those years by indicating terror threat in the southern Turkey.
As well, Turkey has continued to her armament due to maintenance of threats
from other states. Her military expenditures are the first in the region and fourth in
the NATO.44 With relating to this, modernization of weapons, used by army, has
been done by taking into consideration the necessities of region’s provision.
Certainly, NATO standards have been considered but policy of armament and
modernizations have been made in the light of ‘low intensity conflict’.  For example,
in the Cold War era, Turkey and Greece were in a competition about armament and
each was on the alert for their weapons mutually. In the Post-Cold War era, Turkey
has cared about armament of Greece on the one hand, but much paid careful attention
about useful arms in fighting against to terrorism. In the light of experiences gained
from skirmishes and necessities, many new pickup and jeep was bought and tanks
were modernized. In addition, attack helicopters were located and used in the
fighting against terrorism in the southeast although Greece had them near the Turkey
border. A lot of money has been spent for military operations in the southeastern, for
personnel, for arms and for equipments.
                                                
44 Military expenditures of states can be found in Monterey Institute of International Studies and
specifically Turkey’s expenses look at online http://www.tau.ac/iljcssbalanceTurkey.pdf (10.09.2003)
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Additionally, Turkey has not given any concession when her vital national
interest is to subject even if many pressures are made such as in Cyprus issue, both in
intervention phase and in a period finding a solution. Alleging violation of human
rights in the southeastern of Turkey, some European countries and U.S. did not want
to sell weapon to Turkey. For that reason Turkey tried to find alternative channels or
states, which could sell weapon, she wanted. She did not submit to those pressures.
Fourth, with relating to armament, field manuals of military have been changed
considering struggling against to terrorism. Not only new field manuals were
published but also previous field manuals were adapted by adding new chapters
about struggle against to terrorism. In the cold war era, information in such kind of
field manuals was about especially Soviet Union.  Besides until the beginning of
1990s, enemy or ‘red powers’45 were defined as Soviet armies and its strategies and
tactics were written. But in the new field manuals published after 1995, ‘red power’
concept was changed and information about tactics and strategies about enemy were
also changed. As well, measures against WMD are also put these field manuals for
protection of soldiers and troops. Safety against Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC)
arms gained importance in the training and war plans in the army.
Fifthly, command and control structure of army was changed by taking into
account both developments in the world and necessities of fighting against to
terrorism, which requires flexibility and velocity. Number of the Special Forces was
increased from one regiment to three and their main activity plans were only about
the south eastern and eastern of Turkey. Even changing general tendency or path,
which is pursued by the commander who will be the Head of General Staff, is
thought to be changed in the Turkish army. Normally first step for being Head of
                                                
45 In military terms, the red power symbolizes enemy, the blue powers symbolizes own or ally units.
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General Staff is to be a commander of 1st Army, then to be commander of Land
Forces. But it has been discussed about replace to commander of 1st Army with
commander of 2nd. Key point in here is to be able to show the importance of the
region by appointing to the commander, who will be the Head of General Staff, to
this region as a commander of Army.
Consequently, changing security environment with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the outbreak of the Gulf War shifted to milestones of Turkey’s security
policy. Threats Turkey faced from the south are both internal and external which
interact each other -what makes them more dangerous-. All threats emerged for
whole world with the end of Cold War, can be seen in Turkey’s security assessments.
Regional and ethnic conflicts became major problem for Turkey relating with
separatist movements. Nearly all countries around Turkey have WMD whose ranges
include many important cities and structures of Turkey. Dealing with every kind of
terrorism for many years, Turkey mostly felt pains of terrorism in the post-Cold War
era. Fundamentalism is always delicate subject for laic Turkish Republic. As seen, all
threats and security challenges appeared after the Cold War affected Turkey’s
security policy. If it is examined carefully, considering the fact that cornerstone of
the security policy of Turkey is to protect territorial integrity, all matters and threats
can be observed in the south of Turkey. For that reason, Turkey’s security policy
have been renewed to calculate risks from south and concentrated into this region in
the post-Cold War era.
After declaring a war against terrorism within the frame of new NSS, the U.S.
also directed to the Middle East and specifically to Iraq as a starting point of war.
Security anxieties of the U.S. and Turkey met in the Middle East. New situations
emerged. It required new threat assessments. In the next chapter, increased and
decreased Turkish security anxieties will be clarified in the light of Turkey’s main
security policy, to protect territorial integrity.
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CHAPTER V:
EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ON TURKEY’S SECURITY
Beginning of the U.S.’s activation of the NNS for reshaping the Middle East in
the perspective of ‘war against terrorism’ affects Turkey who shifted security
perceptions to the south long before. The NSS of the U.S. and security uneasiness of
Turkey about region conflicted. The application of the NSS in the Middle East has
increased the security concerns of Turkey. Especially Kurdish issue, PKK question
and to a certain degree fundamentalist terrorism have increased their importance.
They have become crucial and more important as a result of U.S.’s coming to the
region and her NSS. This chapter aims to show that, implementation of the American
NSS in the Middle East increased Turkey’s security anxieties.
The NSS of the U.S. is making and will make some changes in the region.
These changes seem inevitable because the U.S. thinks that terrorism stems from the
Middle East. In addition, according to Ronald Asmus, after the Cold War, threat for
the U.S. public comes from the Middle East (Asmus and Pollack, 2004). Dictators,
despot regimes, poverty, radicalism are seen major causes of the terrorism.
According to Americans, terrorism can find life-place due to the lack of authority in
the region. In their opinion, democracy will fill the vacuum caused by the absence of
an authority and it will plug to terrorism canals (Sanberk, 2003). The entire region
should be considered at macro level while evaluating events and changes. It is mostly
believed that Iraqi War is the first step for the U.S. for war against terrorism. Namely
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Iraqi war is micro level. Next steps will follow. This point is confirmed by recent
GME project. In other words, situations that occurred by the Iraqi War constitute one
part of the general frame. In the region, situations, which are related with the
changing processes, and situations that will occur after the war in Iraq must be
considered together.
There is no doubt that a large scaled change such as the transformation of the
Middle East will affect Turkey. Turkey will be a part of the change process because
she is both within the region and ally of the U.S. Turkey has already related with the
region due to the threats coming from there. In the new phase, being a neighbor of
the Middle East and being in alliance with the U.S. are the two primary factors
shaping Turkey’s security situations in the Middle East, which is the application area
of the new American strategy. The basic reason of increasing the anxieties stems
from disagreements between present and future roles Turkey wants to play and the
roles that the U.S. expects from Turkey to play. Rejection of the March 1 motion and
its results are good examples of disagreement between two countries. The present
situation is closely related with the rejection of the motion.46
In this chapter, the effects of the U.S.’s war strategy against terrorism in the
Middle East on Turkey’s security will be examined —by taking post-Cold War threat
perception and security approach of Turkey into account —. Situation of the threats
for Turkey will be clarified. In this manner, it will be showed how American NSS
affected Turkey’s security. While these effects are interpreted, the results of the Iraqi
war will be judged with the general circumstance in the region. Threats both
intensified and lessened will be pointed.
                                                
46 On the other hand, undoubtedly if the motion had been accepted, there would have been different
security problems.
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5.1. Negative Results:
Due to the revision efforts of the U.S., stemmed from fear of terrorism related
with the region and going to war with Iraq in the first step of this change, some of the
threat anxieties of Turkey, on which Turkey has concentrated after the Cold War,
seem to become more visible. There is a war situation, and the tense situations will
continue after Iraqi war. Indeed destabilized region is enough reason to increase the
security annoyances.
5.1.1. A “Kurdish State”
In the threat perception of Turkey, every movement against her territorial
integrity is determined as the most significant peril. According to this determination,
current profits of Kurds in Iraq are primary and the most important security problem
of Turkey. America’s intervention in the region increased or, more correctly, made a
Kurdish state establishment a definite probability47 On one hand, some attempts to
enlarge this “Federal Kurdish state” borders by including some parts of Turkey may
be done in the future, on the other hand as Aydınlı and Özcan argue, Turkey’s own
Kurdish population may want to be a part of such kind of ‘state’. Turkey fears a
‘Kurdish state’ in the region will try to enlarge into Turkey’s border (Aydınlı, Özcan,
2002). Increasing Kurdish nationalism in the region is a problem related with the
Turkey’s integrity. The most important negative effect of the implementation of the
American NSS is the position of the Kurds and their prospective state.
Kurds have great advantages to become an independent state with the help of
American strategy in the region. Many reasons can be set forth for this. First, it can
be a necessity of the American NSS. Kurds’ province can be used as a home for new
                                                
47 According to Talabani, Kurds, who has established and managed their own administration since
1991, have come very close to their aim of establishing a state for the first time (Hürriyet, August 25,
2003).
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bases, which is indicated as a requisite in the American NSS (NSS, 2002: 29) to
implement new policies. In addition, a ‘Kurdish state’ can be a part of the GME
initiative related with the NSS. Other reason can be a dilemma of the U.S. in Iraq.
Since northern part of the Iraq is the only stabilized region of the Iraq, the U.S. does
not want make the situation more complex by offending Kurds. These reasons,
individually or together, increase the probability of a ‘Kurdish state’ establishment in
the region.
Kurds have their own advantages themselves. The first advantage is their
cooperation with the US with relating to American NSS. They are “reliable allies” of
the U.S. in the region. American thought of “the mission would define the
coalition”48 during the implementation of the NSS is the primary reason for this
alignment. It can be said that this alignment is a necessity of the NSS. The U.S., who
trusted Turkey for the northern front, moved with the Kurds due to rejection of the
motion. Michael Radu defines this situation as, “both Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are
now allies of the coalition forces in northern Iraq, with their pesh mergha ("those
who fight to death") irregulars accepting U.S. command in operations there” (Radu,
2003). Because of their supports during the war, U.S. behaves in favour of the Kurds.
The best example for this is that; although Turkey accepted second motion for
sending troops into the Iraq, U.S. gave up the soldier demand due to Kurdish groups’
oppositions. In addition, it should not be forgotten that during the preparation of
                                                
48 When NATO after September 11 invoked its Article V for the first time ever, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld dispatched his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, to say this would not be necessary because
"the mission would define the coalition.” (Hirsh, 2002).
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Transitional Administrative Law, the U.S. concealed the draft from Turkey49 and she
did not consider about the sensitivities of Turkey.
Besides, the U.S. has a tendency to use the Kurds in the following steps of “war
against terrorism” plan in the Middle East. Indeed, Kurdish card is always reserve of
the U.S. in the region. For instance, the U.S. has been using this card after deciding
to implement her NSS. Using Kurds began by sending a celebrity message by
Powell, the U.S. Secretary of State, when Kurdish Parliament was opened in
Northern Iraq on October 2, 2002. After rejection of the motion, demonstrations of
Kurds in Kirkuk showed that U.S. would be with the Kurds hereafter.50 Many
assume that after Iraq, Syria and Iran are in turn. ‘Kurd card’ will be an option for the
U.S. to deal with these states. Namely, Kurds’ role is not limited with Iraq. It means
that close relations between the Kurds and the U.S. will continue and profits of
Kurds will increase.
Second, there is already a de facto state, which has been managing itself for 10
years and designed its administrative affairs, autonomous even from the Saddam
regime.51 In the war period, this position was the same. Big oil resources of Kirkuk
and Mosul were under their control, five memberships were taken in Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) with 4 million-population, their own people were
appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, any coalition unit did not enter
Northern Iraq except small amount of American soldiers, and armed forces were not
dissolved. In other words, it is the only stable region of unstable Iraq. U.S. does not
want to deal with additional problems in Iraq that may appear due to not paying
                                                
49 Turkey took the draft of from Shi'a groups.
50 On March 3, 2003, there was a great demonstration in Irbil. Nearly 50.000 Kurds met in this
demonstration and fired Turkish flags. Murat Yetkin points that events were organized by Barzani’s
IKDP by the help of American secret agencies and military (Yetkin, 2004).
51 It should not be forgotten that Turkish protection to Kurdish groups helped this situation.
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attention to demands of “ally” Kurds.52 Even in the following phases of establishing
a federal Iraq, U.S. may show the social order of Kurdish groups as an example for
the other parts of the Iraq. The current structure can be defined as comfortable in
terms of the U.S.
Third, except the coalition troops, Kurdish groups are the only armed groups
with 80,000 ‘peshmerges’ in Iraq. In addition, these soldiers are equipped with heavy
arms53 and they have been training and will continue to be trained. In the period of
preparing new constitution of the Iraq, Kurds have not wanted to hand over their
weapons. Moreover, they have refused to be a part of Iraqi army and to dissolve their
armed troops. Furthermore, while establishing air forces of the Iraq, the U.S chose 30
candidates, who would be trained in the U.S. to be a pilot in Iraqi air forces, and 27
of them were Kurds. In other words, they have been preparing their forces to use
when necessary.
Fourth, the leaders of Kurdish groups are the most diplomatic experienced
leaders in terms of in Iraq CPA. These experienced leaders have had close relations
with Turkey, U.S. and EU. They also can find international supports easier than other
groups. Additionally, these experiences provide some advantages in CPA. They can
strongly defend and try to take their demands in the council. For instance, Barzani
explained that they agreed with CPA about federalism (NTV, January 14, 2004). As
well, instead of giving only ideas about the constitution before Transitional
Administrative Law, they were able to prepare their own draft for both Iraq and
                                                
52 Barzani threaten that if autonomy including Kirkuk was not given to “Kurdistan”, they would rebel
in the region. (Radikal, January 19, 2004).
53 Talabani explained in an interview that Kurdish pesmerges have heavy weapons such as tank and
artillery (Hürriyet, August 25, 2003).
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“Federal Kurdistan” and presented those to the temporary administration council.54
Besides, two Kurdish groups decided to govern “their Kurdish province” with one-
head government. There was a disagreement between two groups since conflicts in
1994. It created some difficulties to move together. For that reason, IKDP and PUK
agreed on solving this issue (Radikal, January 14, 2004). In this manner, problem
between two groups was solved.
Fifth, although there have been disagreements about the Middle East and Iraqi
war between U.S. and EU, the only issue that they can concur is Kurds. They have
strong support in the world. It is known that some European states, for example
France, strongly support Kurds in every issue. Even before the war, Jacques Chirac,
the President of France, told that France would take part in the war in the case of
attacks of Saddam to the Kurds. Radu asserts that Kurdish "national sentiments"
active in Western Europe (Radu, 2003). Alon Liel, ex-Foreign Affairs diplomat of
Israel, alleges that EU will recognize a Kurdish state if established (Hürriyet,
February 24, 2004). In other words, EU is said to be behind the Kurds. Therefore,
EU will also support rights that will be given to Kurds by the U.S. Even, the conflict
between the U.S. and the EU in Iraq may turn into cooperation on the Kurdish issue.
Sixth, establishing a Kurdish state is useful for Israel’s interests. A ‘Kurdish’
state will disturb both Iran and Syria. When these states deal with the Kurdish
problem, the pressure on Israel will decrease. Israel will not be only problematic
country in the Middle East and so that a second problem55, which the countries of the
region should solve, will arise (Jenkins, 2003). Support to such kind of a ‘Kurdish’
state can be seen as the extension of general Israeli policy, which is to support non-
                                                
54 According to Nihat Ali Özcan, architects of the drafts are Americans. Brenden O'Leary director of
ethno-politics studies center , Peter Galbright ve Halit Salih Kurdish origin American were paid for
preparation of drafts. (Radikal, December 22, 2003).
93
Arab elements.56 In other words, Israeli support is also very important for Kurdish
state.57
Kurds, who were seen as the most benefited group in the war, stiffened their
advantages by gaining a federal state in a federal Iraq with a Transitional
Administrative Law. In the Transitional Administrative Law, a federal structure is
established by 18 cities, but the situation of the north will be determined afterwards.
Also in the Transitional Administrative Law, Kurdish is accepted as an official
language along with Arabic. Lastly, they minted “Kurdish dinar” for using as a valid
currency (Radikal, March 20, 2004).
Kurdish leaders, who explicitly demonstrate their wishes on establishing an
independent state, told that for now conditions are not suitable for being completely
independent, but when the conditions are set, they have an aim to establish an
independent “Kurdistan”. Before the war in Iraq, Iraqi Opposition Meeting was
organized on July 2002 in London to determine how the administration would be
after Saddam, and Iraq KDP declared an idea of “Federal Kurdistan State”, in which
Kirkuk was considered as capital city, in that meeting. During the war and post war
period, necessary conditions have been forming to establish this state. Besides,
before the Transitional Administrative Law was prepared, in 75th article of their own
Kurdistan draft constitution, it was said that if they were in a disagreement with the
Iraqi government, they would use their right of self-determination.58 Briefly,
everybody accept that there will be “Federal Kurdish state” in new Iraq. After that,
                                                                                                                                         
55 Barzani defines Kirkuk as the “Jerusalem of Kurds”.  (Radikal, January, 18, 2004).
56 Detailed information about policy of Israeli to support non-Arab elements in the Middle East can be
found in Meliha B. Altunışık, (ed.) 1999. Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Tarih Kimlik Güvenlik (Turkey and
Middle East: History, Identity, Security). İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları.
57 For that reason, Turkey worries about an establishment permanent alliances between Israel and
Kurds (NTV, November 1,2003).
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when the conditions are suitable, Kurds are going to establish an independent
Kurdistan. For that reason, Turkey thinks that vital security challenges will arise for
the Turkish security, which was already highly concerned about its southern borders,
as it was analyzed in the preceding chapters.
Ankara is worried about the reflections of a Kurdish state on Turkey. This
prospective state would try to enlarge in Turkey, which has 10-12 million Kurd
populations, by demanding some territory from her. The Kurdish groups that are
under Massoud Barzani’s leadership have eight “Kurdistan” maps in their web site
and majority of East and South East Anatolia regions are shown in “Kurdistan”
borders in all of these maps.59 Kurds in Iraq think there some another “Kurdistan”
provinces in the region. Using “Iraqi Kurdistan” or “South Kurdistan” in their
explanations is proof of this thought. According to these explanations, if there is an
Iraqi Kurdistan, there is also a Turkish Kurdistan and if Southern Kurdistan is North
of Iraq, Northern Kurdistan is south of Turkey. As well, in the Khabat newspaper of
IKDP, Barzani said, “Kurdistan was divided after the World War I and its territories
were given to some states. One of those pieces is in Iraq.” (Milliyet, December12,
2003).  Similar thoughts can be found in their “Kurdish dinar”.60 This idea in the
mind of Kurdish leaders’ can be interpreted as a danger to Turkey’s territorial
integrity.
In addition, any kind of Kurdish state may cause to stimulate the idea of
Kurdish nationalism in the region. There are Kurds in both Syria and Iran. Gaining
high advantages in Iraq will ignite their sense of nationalism in these regions. Gareth
                                                                                                                                         
58 The drafts of constitution for Iraq and “Federal Kurdistan” prepared by Kurdish groups can be
found in http://www.kurdnet.net/www.kdp.info/reports/reports_detail.asp?intReportNr=1153
(December 25, 2003).
59 One of those web sites is http://www.kurdnet.net
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Smyth alleges that giving wide autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq inspired other Kurds
living in regional countries (Financial Times, March 18, 2004).  Ethnic problems can
be expected to erupt. It brings chaos and instability to the region. Events on March
12 in Syria and March 15 in Iran are indications of future problems.61 The spread of
this movement to Turkey due to her own Kurdish origined citizens with demands of
unifying with “Iraqi Kurdistan” can be evaluated as a second situation in terms of
security anxiety of Turkey about a Kurdish state.
Briefly, Turkey, who tried to defend her own territorial integrity in the
southeast for almost 20 years, is in a more dangerous period in terms of territorial
integrity due to the position of Kurds in the region. Because Kurds profited from the
situation in Iraq very much and such kind of profits will increasingly continue due to
following steps of the U.S. who is planning to continue to use the Kurds as a card to
region states.
5.1.2. The Situation of the PKK Terrorist Organization:
Turkey lost initiative and is limited about PKK terrorism after coming of the
U.S. into the region. Before the Iraqi War, Turkey localized PKK issue. But, since
the region, as in the first Gulf War, has become international again, control of area
has been lost. The U.S. is active in the event again. Although PKK terrorism is not as
active, almost finished even in the mountains, Turkey cannot totally destroy it due to
losing her maneuver area. As well, future of what will be done to PKK became even
more ambiguous.
                                                                                                                                         
60 Kurdish dinar was minted in Switzerland. On the money, there are phrase of “Kurdistan” and four
mountains remaining side by side. Those mountains symbolize presence of Kurds in Iraq, Turkey,
Syria and Iran. Date of the money is 2003 (Radikal, March 20, 2004).
61 After a football match, Kurds in Syria made trouble. In those events they demanded more rights in
the country.
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The PKK terror, which was the most important security problem of Turkey in
early 90s, entered in the waiting process after their leader is caught and almost 5000
militants located in Candle Mountain. When the U.S. interfered in the region, waiting
process, in terms of making terrorist attacks, has continued due to the complexity of
the region. Turkey thinks that if PKK does some actions, she has the right to interfere
in the region and will interfere. Such a situation creates chaos on one the hand; it also
causes conflict between Kurdish groups and Turkey out of U.S.’s control on the other
hand. For that reason, both the U.S. and Kurdish groups do not permit PKK to make
any action in the region. In addition, the organization, which needs logistic base to
fight in the mountains, loses its logistic support. Therefore, it seems that active PKK
threat is disappeared for now.
On the other hand, Turkey has been obliged to fulfill policies determined by the
U.S. The security problems related with the PKK can be described as; Turkey cannot
apply own policies against the organization to evaporate it completely and there is
vagueness about the future of the organization. It tries to become a political figure
and its members try to come into Turkey. The uncertainty, related with what is going
to be done and what is going to happen, are followed with annoyance in Turkey.
Since the U.S. tries to take Turkey away from the region, Turkey cannot do much.
Existence of Turkey in the northern part of Iraq may make issues more complex for
the U.S. who does not want to deal with northern part of the Iraq because she has
enough problems in the other parts of the country. Due to their disquiet, Kurds are
opposing Turkish existence in the region. They may think that, Turkey may use her
existence in the region as a card against a ‘Kurdish state’. Namely, Turkey may use
PKK issue as a ‘mask’ against Kurds. For that reason, troops of Turkey, which have
been in the northern part of Iraq for controlling the border and region because of the
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PKK terrorism, create uneasiness especially among Kurds. Several times, they
demand from Turkey to withdraw these troops. Even, Behram Salih ‘threatened’
Turkey with using force against Turkish troops in the north part of the Iraq (Hurriyet,
March 20, 2004).
Nevertheless, Turkey does not accept to withdraw her troops from there since
that region is the only place where Turkey watches the events actively. The region is
not completely safe in terms of terrorists’ passing through borders and their activities
in the region. Also, Turkey suspects that evacuating the region would make terrorists
freer. Moreover, if the terrorist events start again, strong and quick reply will not be
given. Existence of troops in the region until it becomes completely safe provides
Turkey the control over the terrorists and events.
Indeed, PKK was one of the main issues of the motion bargaining with the U.S.
(Bila, 2003). U.S.’s behaviors during the bargaining of this concept are considered as
recondite.62 This obscure manner has continued after the war. Turkey has wanted the
U.S. to fight with the PKK, which is in the terrorist organizations list of the U.S.,
more seriously but the U.S. does not give any satisfactory answers or action to this
desire.63 Turkey is waited with a tactic of distracting. The U.S. does not seem to want
to interfere in Candle Mountain. In March 17, the U.S.’s head of General Staff Myers
explained, “They would fight with PKK with ‘suitable methods’” (NTV, March 20,
2004). It shows that they do not intend to interfere yet. On the other hand, Turkey
cannot make any intervention to this organization and she has to behave according to
the U.S.’s wishes. Concerning U.S.’s wishes “law of returning home” was accepted
                                                
62 According to Mustafa Balbay, in secret document discussed between Turkey and the U.S., the U.S.
mentioned about necessities of war against terrorist organizations in the region but name of the PKK
was not in this document. (Balbay, 2003).
63 This situation can be evaluated as a contradiction of the U.S. fighting with terrorism.
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by the Parliament but results are not as expected.64 Main aim was support the U.S. to
solve the problems by the help of this law and to take Turkey away from the north
part of the Iraq. Even, Ümit Özdağ says that there are rumors about a bargain
between the U.S. and PKK for this amnesty law (Özdağ, 2003). Despite the
propaganda, especially in East and Southeast Anatolia, there is no solution in PKK’s
armed mountain elements.
Organization’s efforts for becoming political are another issue that disturbs
Turkey. The recent aim of the PKK is to make some political maneuvers to find a life
zone for them. The organization, renamed as Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra-
Gel), announced that the organization dissolved by itself in its second Extraordinary
Congress. While the military resources tell that the organization will increase their
“political activities”, it is told that the organization makes “Public Defense Forces”
autonomous and they try to put themselves out of the name of “terrorist
organization”. In this frame, the organization tried to activate under the name of
Democratic Solution Party in Iraq, but the U.S. closed this party with a sudden attack
on 30 January. Another issue related with this is, it is well known that Mahmud
Osman representative in CPA is a sympathizer and supporter of PKK (Özdağ, 2003).
Another issue carefully followed by Turkey is that members of terrorist
organization try and want to trespass the boundaries of Turkey secretly and to blend
in the public. In the Mahmur camp in northern Iraq, there are refugees, who
emigrated from Turkey to Iraq in the years of increasing PKK terrorism. UN,
Turkey, U.S and Iraq made an agreement for returning of those to Turkey on January
22, 2004 (NTV, January 23, 2004).  It is suspected that while refugees come back to
Turkey, militants of PKK will attempt to appear as a refugee and enter to Turkey.
                                                
64 The numbers of applicants, including other organizations’ members, are declared as 3277.  2616 of
these applications are made from the prisons. 663 of 1518 militants of PKK are released. Namely
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Doubts arouse from the numbers of refugees and demands of UN’s representative.
The number of immigrants to Mahmur camp was about nine thousand people 10
years ago (Radikal, December 11, 2003). Now the number returning to Turkey is
mentioned as twelve thousand. When it is thought that the augmentation of
population cannot be that much, this difference causes suspicions In addition, three
preconditions are set for the returning of those refugees. These are listed as; returning
refugees will be located to specific regions according to their wishes, men are
excused from the compulsory military service and there will be no investigation and
questioning for those refuges after returning to Turkey. These types of conditions
cause suspicion in Turkey.
The reason why the U.S. is not willing to interfere with the PKK may be her
wishes using the PKK as a card or an option in the region (Sönmezoğlu, 2003). Faruk
Sönmezoğlu argues that forcing PKK’s militants to go Iran for disturbing her, using
against Syria, using as a balancing unit against Kurdish groups in Iraq or using
against Turkey in order to prevent her making any uncontrolled actions can be listed
for being an option of the U.S.
Namely, Turkey lost her initiative to take a step against PKK. She is limited
with the policies of the U.S. Besides, although it is seemed that there is no danger
situation related with PKK for now, if U.S. does not concern seriously with the
situation, this would make the conditions imperceptible. Turkey entered in a “wait
and see” period in the PKK issue.
5.1.3. New Terror Events Seen in Turkey:
After the U.S. went towards Middle East actively, Turkey’s role began to be
questioned in perspective of new developments. The role of Turkey as a ‘Pivotal’ or
                                                                                                                                         
mountain staff of PKK remains.
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‘front state’ against terrorism has been frequently discussed. Being a front country
probably means that Turkey may take the Germany’s Cold War mission. Terrorist
attacks happening after the Iraqi War showed that terrorists are ready to accept
Turkey as a new front and they are ready to fight in the new front.
After Iraqi war, in Turkey there have been three attacks, which carry out the
properties of new terrorism. Two attacks in November 2003 and one in March 2004
show that Turkey is one of the target states for terrorists. According to Graham
Fuller, the regional events in the Muslim world bring terrorism to Turkey (Fuller,
2003). Even, Paul Marie De la Gorce suggests that Turkey became the new
battlefield in the war with terrorism started after September (De la Gorce, 2003).
Additionally, Hüseyin Bağcı claims that, choosing Turkey as a target is not a
coincidence, it is deliberate because, Turkey is an example country who lives Islam
with democracy (Bağcı, 2003) and supports the U.S. policies. In an interview with
Follman, terrorism expert Jessica Stern says that, with its secular Islamic government
particularly damnable in the eyes of fundamentalists, Turkey is as prime a target as
any for Al-Qaeda (Follman, 2003). For example, there will be a NATO summit in
Turkey in June. Presidents and Prime Ministers of NATO countries will come to
Turkey. They are good targets for terrorists. In May 15, CIA sent a report to Turkish
government and security units about some activities of terrorists planning to take an
action during the summit (Milliyet, May 16, 2004).
Besides, November attacks were performed soon after canceling the decision to
send troops to Iraq. One of the main aims of terrorists may be sending a message not
to support the U.S.’s regional policies. In addition, Ömer Bekri, the leader of El
Muhacirun group whose centre in London, calls whole Muslims to remove from
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power the Turkish government (Radikal, March 15, 2004). By determining the roles
of Turkey for next phases of transformation, this type of attacks will increase.
In addition to this, the terrorist organizations and actions aiming to the U.S. will
also disturb Turkey. As well chosen as activation area, Turkey will also be
determined and used as a base by these organizations.
5.1.4. Invalidation of ‘Red Lines’:
Red lines, which are clear signs to the others not to cross the minimums,
indicate ‘musts’ of Turkish policy. They have important role in Turkey’s foreign
affairs. These are concrete outputs of deterrence concept. They have been used for
indicating the tolerance limitation of Turkey about security issues. For instance, in
Aegean Sea about territorial waters and continental shelf, Turkey declared that 12
miles is a reason of war against Greece. Especially after the 90s, within more active
foreign policy there seemed to be an increase in the number of these lines.
Nevertheless, coming of a superpower into the region has obliged Turkey not to do
what these lines necessitate on the one hand and to revise her Red Line policy
according to U.S. priorities on the other hand.
Before the war, Turkey drew some red lines and she declared if those lines had
been exceeded, she would interfere to the situation and region. These sensibilities
were put on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was signed between
Turkey and the U.S. about technical details to open a northern front in war.
According to the information given by Fikret Bila (Bila, 2003), Mustafa Balbay
(Balbay, 2003) and Murat Yetkin (Yetkin, 2004) Red Lines in the MOU can be listed
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as follows: Kurds will not interfere in Mosul and Kirkuk after war and these cities
will not be Kurdish cities, Turcoman will not be pressured, the new administration
will be central and a Kurdish government, whatever the type is, will not be accepted,
terrorists will not be allowed to create a ‘saved region’ in Iraq.
The red lines put before war related with the region have been crossed over. On
April 9 day of ending of war and following day, Kurds entered in Mosul and Kirkuk,
destroyed all documents in both Public Registration Office and Register of Title
Deed. They attacked Turcomans. As well, Turcoman are represented with only one
member in CPA.65 Turcoman’s situation and rights were not taken into consideration
while preparing Transitional Administrative Law. Turkish demands about
Turcomans have not been realized. Additionally, PKK terror organization is waiting
on the Candle Mountain, which can almost be named as a ‘liberated zone’.  Finally,
Kurds have taken very important steps and advanced to establish a state. Everybody
agrees on the fact that Kurds are very close to become a federal state. Kurds will not
loose their gains after this point. Turkey could not do anything about those Red
Lines. Namely, Turkey’s red lines became invalid.
It brings us to a point that, Turkey, who has deterrence by the help of showing
her power to region countries and has declared Red Lines about some issues, from
now on will have to take U.S.’s policies into consideration about region. Either these
red lines will be in harmony with the policies of the U.S. or Turkey cannot draw such
lines. For instance if a ‘Kurdish state’ in the region is in the interest of the U.S.,
Turkey cannot behave on her own easily.
On the other hand, seeing that Red Lines of Turkey can be crossed, other
countries may also try to advance in other security problems that are determined with
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red lines. Such situations might create problems since Turkey may give very strict
reply against them in order to gain her prestige about Red Lines and restore her
deterrence. For instance, Greece may try to increase her territorial waters to 12 miles.
In normal condition, minor conflicts in the Aegean can be expected. But now Turkey
may directly hit in all Greek planes or ships for repairing her prestige and showing
her seriousness.  In other words, minor event may create bigger outcomes than
expected.
5.1.5. Damaged Relations with the U.S.:
Before Iraq war, the U.S-who had thought that Turkey would open the
Northern front -and Turkey -who had thought that the U.S. could not go to war
without Turkey-, lived a crisis due to the rejection of motion. According to many,
‘Strategic Partnership’ was ended. Everybody questioned the future of the Turk-
American relations. Henceforth, suspicions of both sides will be in the mind of them.
Especially Turkey has been affected from ‘motion crisis. According to Tarık Oğuzlu,
Turkey would not feel so secure the U.S. supports to predominantly Turkish Foreign
Policy interests (Oğuzlu, 2003: 1).
Although, Turkey gave the U.S. permission to use the air space and took
decision to send troops with the second motion, the relation does not seem to be like
before. Seizure of Turkish officers on 23rd April -though their activities were known
by the U.S. - and ‘sack event’66 on 4th July prove that relations are deeply injured.
Head of General Staff Hilmi Özkök described ‘sack event’ as “the deepest trust
crisis” (Hürriyet, July 6,2003). According to Ümit Özdağ although the U.S. was
                                                                                                                                         
65 According to Ümit Özdağ, whether this member is Turcoman is doubtful (Özdağ, 2003).
66 On July 4, 2003, American forces made a surprise attack on Turkish Liaison Office and Office of
the Turkmen Front in Kirkuk with Kurdish pesmerges.  The Turkish officers, who were working for
coordination with the U.S. in the region, were seized and sack was made to wear on their heads.
During three days, the ‘ally’ American forces interrogated them.
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angry about Turkey during the war, she pursued ‘calm revenge’ policy against
Turkey. However, after the war, pressure and revenge policies were materialized
(Özdağ, 2003).
The rejection of the motion67 made people think what the topics were going to
be, such as the U.S.’s military and technology supports and aids to Turkey, Cyprus
issue, EU membership, Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, relations with IMF. For now, any
negative results related with these issues have not yet appeared. Since problems of
the U.S. in Iraq and uncertainty in the region, the U.S. does not behave emotional.
They perceive pragmatic policies. She does not want to burn the bridges with Turkey
because she still needs Turkey.
On the other hand, Turkey remained out of the developments in the region
especially in Iraq. It must be accepted that events presented as negative results stem
from ‘motion crisis’, which damaged the relations between Turkey and the U.S.
Firstly, Turkey, is not able to take part in establishing the new administration of Iraq.
The sensitivities of Turkey are not taken into consideration. Second, Turkey willing
to repair the relations with the U.S. seems too eager to cooperate with the U.S.
Turkey may take heavy responsibilities, which cannot be accepted by her in normal
conditions. Many concessions related with foreign policy may be given. Such a
situation may be seen during the implementation of the GME initiative. Özdağ
alleges that efforts for restoring relations with the U.S. have given a chance to the
U.S. to develop a pressure policy on Turkey (Özdağ, 2003). During the process of
rebuilding the Middle East, it is evaluated that these pressures will continue.
5.2. Positive Result:
                                                
67 Indeed, although the problem is rejection of motion, main problem is that Turkey distract the U.S.
as if she had accepted the motion but she did not approved the motion at the end. The U.S. lost time.
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Besides security problems have been increased, some events that Turkey
perceived as a threat after the Cold War lost their importance due to the coming of
the U.S. to the region. The basic results of lessening the importance of those threats
are firstly Syria and Iran think that they will be next target after Iraq and the U.S. is
very serious about this issue (Rogers, 2003). Additionally, they have problems about
protecting their territorial integrities with related with the Kurdish issue.
5.2.1. Approach of Iran:
Iran, who felt the pressure on herself with the interference of the U.S. in the
region, started to develop relations with Turkey and she has tried to stay close with
Turkey. There are common points that matter to both countries. First of them is the
integrity of Iraq. It is in the interest of both countries for their own territorial integrity
since both of them have sensitivities on ‘Kurdish state concept’. In addition to that,
Iran, who thinks that the next can be her, accepts investigation of UN inspectors
about nuclear studies (Hurriyet, October 22, 2003). She has also stopped nuclear
activities. In other words, producing ballistic weapons in Iran, which is perceived as
a threat to Turkey, is stopped. Besides two countries have ever has such kind of close
relations.
5.2.2. Approach of Syria:
Syria, who feels similar pressure as Iran, tries to establish good relations with
Turkey. Relations between Ankara and Damascus, also marked by high-level visits,
improved in 2003 as well. Abdullah Gül visited Damascus in April; his Syrian
counterpart, Farouq al-Shara, traveled to Turkey in January; and Syrian Prime
Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro went to Ankara in July. The most important visit
of the year, however, was Asad's recent trip, during which the Syrian leader carefully
avoided controversial issues especially about Hatay. In other words, Syria who
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disturbed the territorial integrity of Turkey, gives up this behavior. In a commercial
agreement, Syria accepted that Hatay belongs to Turkey (Milliyet, January 6, 2004).
In addition, with signing security cooperation agreement, two countries made a
progress in their relations. Its results can be seen after terror events in Istanbul. Syria
extradicted suspects wanted by Turkey. As well, due to Turkey’s request, Syria
forbade foreign students to get education in religious schools.68
Perhaps, for the first time Turkey has become this close with Iran and Syria.
Nevertheless, there are some factors limiting this approach. Due to not wanting to
disturb the U.S. with this approach, Turkey restricted herself. In addition, Israel
became a part of activity because she is also disturbed from this approach. As a
counter attack, Israel wanted to hold Turkey in check by signing Manavgat Water
Project on February 16, 2004. As a result, Turkey has some profits related with
security due to the U.S. plan about region. However, these are limited and they
cannot balance losses of Turkey in the region.
5.3. Situations Emerged with the ‘Greater Middle East’ Project:
It is generally believed that Iraqi war is the first step to the implementation of
the NSS. Put forth ‘GME’ project for consideration is evidence that the U.S. will
make some changes in the region and this changes will not be limited with Iraq. This
project may change depending on the situation. However, putting by such kind of a
project, the U.S. is determined to give a new shape to Middle Eastern countries’
regimes that are seen as the root of terrorism. Though the details of the project are
not known, its scope will be the same what was discussed recently. Since this project
                                                
68 Emerging that suspicious related with the terror events in Istanbul were educated in religious
schools in Syria, makes this demand necessary in terms of Turkey.
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includes Turkey,69 especially negative elements indicated above should be
considered in the macro level with relation to Turkey’s role, which is considered to
be given, or Turkey wants to take. Emerge of some situations related with the
security of Turkey is inevitable.
In the next step of the transformation of the Middle East, the U.S. may want to
give Turkey, as Özcan points, three kinds of roles (Özcan, 2004). First is the model
role. Turkey is being indicated as a model that possess both Muslim and democratic
features. Turkey is a Western Muslim country; Özdem Sanberk points that Turkey is
located at the breaking point of GME project (Sanberk, 2003). It is told that Turkey
is seen as a locomotive country. In recent times, the explanations of either Prime
Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran, Malaysia and Kuwait are seemed to
persuade Muslim countries in this context. For instance, in the fifth meeting of
‘Neighbor Countries of Iraq and Region Countries’ Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Abdullah Gül, offered to establish Peace Forces among Muslim countries to provide
security in the Middle East (NTV, February 14, 2004). Moreover, he offered to unite
like European states. As for Prime Minister, R.Tayyip Erdoğan, he offered to Muslim
countries to turn their face to the West in Malaysia (NTV, February 20, 2004).
Nevertheless, the Islamic and democratic identity of Turkey has already been
since establishing of the Republic. She has never been taken as a model by region
countries especially by the Arabic states. Besides, they have criticized Turkey
because of the secular structure. For that reason, the U.S. wants Turkey to play
Democratic-Muslim role more actively by regarding her Muslim identity. For
instance, in one of his speeches Powell defined Turkey as ‘Islamic Republic’ like
Pakistan (Radikal, April 2, 2004). Since many objections and criticisms were risen,
                                                
69 According to Muhammed Nureddin, the relations of Turkey with the project are first appeared in
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statement was tried to be corrected by emphasizing to importance of ‘secular’
dimension of Turkey (NTV, April 4, 2004). As well, the party in power is so
available to play such kind of a role. Nowadays, “Moderate Islam” and “conservative
democrats” debates have increased in Turkey. Some minor modifications may be
thought in the structure of Turkey. The Islamic identity of Turkey has been more
emphasized. The difficult and dangerous side of these events is that the U.S. may let
things get out of hand, because it is a very sensitive issue in Turkey. Religion can
easily be exploited. If it would do so, regime debates would appear even it started.
Emphasizing Islamic identity of Turkey and giving more importance than the secular
one disturbs many especially Military. General İlker Başbuğ, Deputy Chief of
General Staff, explained, “ ‘moderate Islam’ is not secular, for that reason Turkey
has not have a claim for being a model” (Radikal, March 20, 2004). Due to its
sensitivity, if this issue is considered more and if all sides are not careful, it will
create internal crises, which reach over to the regime debates. Military does not allow
making a regime debate in Turkey since Turkey’s regime is evident. It is secular. 27
February is the best example of it. Tension in the internal policy may increase.
Second role, expected from Turkey, is related with her geography. The
geostrategic value of a country is not only measured by its geography. It is also
measured by the ability to use these advantages related with the geography. In the
change process, the U.S. also plans to benefit Turkey’s territory according to the
tasks of the project. Benefits the U.S. from Turkey’s geography in the transformation
of the Middle East are; controlling of the region, command and control facilities,
using as a base to the national missile defense system and as evidence that the war
against the terror is not against Islam. Even some argue that, Turkey, who was ‘side’
                                                                                                                                         
the meeting of Bush-Erdoğan on 28th March (Zaman, March 1, 2004)
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country in the cold war process, will become a ‘central’ country in the war of the
U.S. against the terror and will take the Cold War duty and role of Germany (Petkov,
2004). This argument is verified by the U.S.’s demands during the motion bargains
such as locating great amount of soldiers for a long period, using many bases in
Turkey.70 After the rejection of the motion, planning to change status of the Incirlik
base and wanting to use it against the terrorism can be showed as additional
evidences. If NATO’s new mission area is determined as the Middle East, such a
demand will increase. In that case, Turkey will be Germany of the Cold War period.
It will increase the importance of Turkey in NATO on one side; Turkey will be
openly target of terrorists on the other. Turkey may become struggle field in the
period.
However, it can be thought that, the role of being a central country was
postponed due to rejection of the motion. Nevertheless, demands of the U.S. about
increasing the number of bases, is one of the possible conditions that Turkey can
meet. As well, if Turkey became central country, it can be thought that terrorist
attacks targeting to U.S., Israel and Turkey would increase in the country.
Third, Turkey may be asked to send soldiers or to train the region countries’
soldiers in order to actively participate in the change process. Additionally, with the
project if NATO or UN took mission in the region, new army structure, considering
dealing with terrorism, would be thought for NATO’s army or UN peace operations
(Cordesman, 2004). Turkey will need new army structure in order to keep up with
the new process. Search efforts will try how the new structure of army will be. New
Special Forces and new trainings are needed to adapt to these conditions. Small but
rapid units will be needed. Another point, that relating with the military structure, is
                                                
70 80 thousand soldiers, location of 250 planes, usage of 14 airports and 5 harbors were wanted from
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about the threat evaluation. Henceforth, threat coming from the region will not from
a state but from non-state actors due to the application of the project. These two
situations show that change process will force Turkey to revise her army structure
according to ‘war against terrorism’ concept. Indeed revision has already started in
the Turkish army.71 This revision period may gain speed. Since changing world and
changing dimensions of security require that kind of a revision, it will have positive
impact on Turkish army structure. Professionalism will increase. Army will become
smaller, more flexible and more effective than it is now.
As a result, implementation of the U.S.’s NSS, prepared for ‘war against
terrorism’ after September 11 attacks, has created both negative and positive results
in terms of Turkey’s security. But it is seen that if Turkey’s post-Cold War security
and threat assessment is considered negative results are more dominant than positive
ones. Turkey’s security anxieties increased. Instability of the region is a problem all
on its own. Future actions in the region are not so clear. Especially, ‘Kurdish state’,
PKK and fundamentalist terrorism problems have gained more importance. These
negative results related with the territorial integrity will give a big headache to
Turkey in the long term. Among these threats, ‘Kurdish state’ issue settled at the top.
Besides, Turkey doesn’t have many options to find a solution to these threats.
Neighborhood and alliances have obliged Turkey to be included in transformation
period of the Middle East. Effects of the September 11 attacks taking its roots from
‘new terrorism’ reached to Turkey due to the implementation of NSS by the U.S.
These effects have increased security anxieties of Turkey.
                                                                                                                                         
Turkey by USA before the Iraqi war.
71 This Project is being carried out under the name of ‘Concept 2010’ by the Turkish Head of General
Staff.
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CHAPTER VI:
       CONCLUSION
Al-Qaeda network by using ‘New Terrorism’ dynamics have become a non-
state actor in the international arena by hitting the U.S. in her homeland. It showed
that the superpower is vulnerable. It challenged the hegemon. Today’s policies and
relations stemmed from September 11 attacks. Attacks carried the features of ‘new
terrorism’. Since the U.S. public and the administration are convinced that terrorism
is the major threat for their security after the Cold War, ‘war against terrorism’ has
become the frame of international relations. After the September 11 attacks, foreign
policy of the U.S. became terrorism oriented. Terrorism phobia infected to the U.S.
New enemy being searched after the Cold War was decided as terrorism.
Many knew that after the September 11, the U.S. would give strong respond to
repair many things. There are many methods to struggle with terrorism. Due to the
pain and shock, the U.S. decided to use the power and the military measures to fight
with the terrorism. According to U.S. government, classical deterrence cannot be a
tool for this war as characteristics of new threat are very different and very difficult
to deal with it. Everybody who hates Americans can be enemy and these enemies can
be in anywhere anytime. Applying strict measures by using force is a good way to
show that the U.S. is very serious about dealing with terrorism. Global war against
terrorism would be started. 
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For realization of this thought, the new NSS was prepared and put into action.
Indeed, there were no big changes in proportion to previous strategies apart from ‘the
motive’ to implement necessities pointed in the strategy. September 11 created this
‘motive’. NSS of the U.S. dominantly shows the way of war against terrorism than
aim of the strategy. Aims in the strategy can be listed as defeating terrorism and
rouge states, bringing democracy to whole world for cutting support to terrorism and
democratization of dictatorships. Nevertheless, major points in the methodology of
the NSS are; preemption, unilateralism and primacy of power. It clearly declares that
the U.S. would fight this war at any cost. Although there were strong oppositions in
great part of the world, use of force was chosen by the U.S. Besides, implementation
of the NSS would supply many extra interest and advantage to the U.S.
The Middle East was chosen for implementation of the strategy. The U.S. sees
that terrorism against American interests emerge from this region because there is a
lack of authority in some places and many undemocratic states are in there. They
think that democratization of those states will solve the terrorism problem. For that
reason, transformation of the Middle East is necessary or ‘obligatory’. Iraq was
chosen as a first step. Although many assert that it is wrong to start a war with
terrorism and the U.S. pursues other interests, they started to implement their
strategy.
Turkey, which had turned towards Middle East relating with security issues and
threat perceptions long before the U.S., has been affected from this process, because
she is both neighbor to the region and ally of the U.S. at the same time. Since
changing plan was started from Iraq, it was inevitable that events would influence
Turkey’s security. Namely, the new NSS of the U.S. has created both negative and
positive results in terms of Turkey’s security. Probability of an establishment any
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kind of a ‘Kurdish state’ in Iraq, losing initiative on PKK terrorist organization issue,
‘new terror’ events in Turkey, invalidation of ‘red lines’ about foreign policy and
damaged relations with the U.S. can be listed as the negative results. As for positive
results, they can be pointed as, approach with Syria and Iran, lessening the
importance of the WMD threat from region countries. But negative results are more
dominant than positive results. Some post-Cold War security anxieties have been
feeling more intensely. In this context, implementation of the U.S.’s NSS has created
negative results for Turkey’s security and increased seriousness of some her threat
perceptions.
Considering the fact that Turkey defines every action against her territorial
integrity as a major threat, probability of a ‘Kurdish state’ has become main anxiety
of Turkey. Perhaps, a ‘federal Kurdish state’ in Iraq will be established. Turkey
normally fears that such a state will create big problems for own territorial integrity.
It is the most critical issue among results of the negative situations. Although it
seems very difficult, henceforth, Turkey should stress on preventing the
establishment of a ‘Kurdish state’ while expressing her demands about Iraq to the
U.S. Recently, Turkey is emphasizing on the PKK issue. Nevertheless, PKK is not so
dangerous owing to the developments in the region. It is true that it is hazardous for
Turkey’s security but not as dangerous as ‘Kurdish state’ for today. Turkey should
reevaluate her threat perception and make hierarchy among negative results. Priority
should be given the Kurdish state issue, not PKK. In the new structure of the Middle
East, Turkey should strongly defend the idea that any kind of ‘Kurdish state’ brings
chaos into the region. On the other, Turkey should prepare alternative plans in case
of establishment a ‘Kurdish state’. Because the profits of the Kurds are very much
and they are very close to establish a state. In order to decrease or prevent reflections
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of such kind of state into the Turkey, she should start to take some measures in the
country. She must pursue careful policies for not giving any concession relating with
her territorial integrity. Being careful while doing some amendments in the laws and
in the constitution is very important for not giving any advantages to people who
have the idea that east and south east of Turkey are part of ‘Kurdistan’. How the
extension of this ‘prospective state’ can be stopped or prevented might be future
research.
As well, although PKK issue is in a waiting process, it can be big problem for
Turkey again. Restart of terrorist activities may limit Turkey’s foreign policy field.
Besides, Turkey may not concentrate on other important security issues such as
‘Kurdish state’ in Iraq. For not being outside of the developments in the region,
Turkey should keep on careful about PKK and continue to pressure on the U.S. for
eliminating the organization completely.
Additionally, Turkey should not give permission any debates about her regime.
Laic and democratic character of the state should be emphasized. If Islamic character
of Turkey is underlined more, it creates regime trouble in the state. For that reason,
Turkey should remind the U.S. that Turkey will not give any concession from her
laic and democratic character.
Another important issue is future role of Turkey in the changing process of the
Middle East. The role Turkey will burden is very critical as seen in Iraq issue.
Changing process will be continued although American administration is changed.
Because failure both in Iraq and in the region is not an option for the U.S. Methods
may be changed in order to gain aims. For instance, use of force may be given and
diplomatic and multilateral options may come on the scene. However, the expression
of ‘war against terrorism’ will continue. The U.S. will not give up this idiom. For
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that reason, Turkey should be ready for taking different kinds of role in order to
compensate negative situations for her security in ongoing developments. It should
be thought that if the U.S. manages to insert the NATO in this process, what kind of
role Turkey may play and what kind of military troops may be needed. Especially,
type of army’s structure to fight against ‘new terrorism’ should be evaluated. It is
correct that Turkish army is experienced about both fighting against terrorism due to
the PKK terrorism and taking active role in UN and NATO operations. Nevertheless,
the situations in the Middle East are very different. Taking a role in the war against
terrorism and state building mission in the region requires new kind of military
concepts. New structure of Turkish army with relating to future NATO’s mission
both in the region and in terrorism operations may be another research subject.
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